

Neutral, Neutered or Pacifist? Can Ireland’s Model of Neutrality Remain Aligned With its Foreign Policy Ambitions Amidst the Re-Emergence of Conflict in Europe.

Ger Hynes

The subject of neutrality has seen a resurgence, both in Ireland and in a wider European context owing to Russia’s 24th of February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, its second violation of Ukrainian sovereignty after its 2014 annexation of Crimea. With the Taoiseach having stated that “neutrality is a policy issue that can change at any time” (Leahy & Gallagher, 2022) and stating in Washington that “we are not politically neutral, we’re not morally neutral and as the world changes, our position has to evolve with that change” (Martin, 2022), debate has emerged again on Ireland’s policy of neutrality.

Seeking to answer whether Ireland’s model of neutrality can remain aligned with its foreign policy ambitions, this paper analyses proponent and opponent views on neutrality and explores a gap in the literature on the concept of pacifism and Irish Neutrality, where questions are being asked nationally, and internationally, of the credibility of Irish Neutrality amidst the re-emergence of war in Europe.

This paper finds that Ireland’s policy of military neutrality does not align with accepted concepts of neutrality reflected in literature on the topic. The paper finds Irish Neutrality is better described as military non-alignment which is labelled “neutrality”. Lacking a national security strategy to direct how Ireland will protect her interests, such a strategy could include non-alignment, however, permanent neutrality, armed or unarmed, would not align with Ireland’s foreign policy ambitions.

The term “Opponent” is used throughout this paper as the antithesis to “Proponent” of neutrality, to broadly describe a sliding scale of those who may only be critical of some facets of Irish Neutrality up to those who may be completely opposed to Irish Neutrality. The central argument espoused by opponents of Irish Neutrality can be broadly summarised in the “Unneutral Ireland” thesis which originates from the work of Salmon, T.C. (1989). Salmon questions the credibility of Irish Neutrality arguing that Ireland has never been neutral by any commonly accepted legal definition nor by many of its actions in contrast with other commonly accepted “neutral countries”. In arguing that thesis, opponents of Irish Neutrality frequently cite Ireland’s lack of a credible defence capability as a neutral, evidenced by the 2022 report of the Commission on Defence (CODF, 2022; McNamara, 2022a). The proposal of the Russian Federation to conduct naval exercises in Ireland’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)



in early 2022, highlighted the lack of both primary radar¹ and ability to monitor subsea activities (Brady, 2022a). Concerns for the vulnerability of submarine cables in the Irish EEZ after the sabotage of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in September 2022 (O’Leary, 2022), were posited as proof of Ireland being “Neutered” rather than “Neutral”, along with pronouncements of “Ireland’s Defence deficit” (McNamara, 2022b), and of Ireland being “Europe’s weakest link” (Drea, 2022). Further, the un-neutral argument sees pronouncements from certain political quarters, (Richmond, 2022; Berry, 2022) that Ireland should provide weapons as well as non-lethal aid to Ukraine. In contrast to opponents of neutrality, proponents in active interest groups and political parties oppose increases in Defence spending suggested in the CODF report (PANA, 2022b; Barry, 2022).

Proponents of neutrality have galvanised “in the face of vicious attacks on Irish Neutrality” (PANA, 2022a) with the coming together of groups like the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) with others to form the “Irish Neutrality League”, a renewal of sorts of a group of the same name founded in 1914, who counter-argue that Ireland is unequivocally neutral. Others see neutrality as being under attack from those who wish to undermine Irish Neutrality by “exploiting the terrible crisis in Ukraine” (Barret, 2022).

Questions are being raised on challenges of consensus in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and what the re-emergence of large-scale traditional conflict in Europe for the first time since 1945 will mean, not only for EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO, but for Ireland, evidenced in the debate on both sides about the Triple Lock. The “Triple Lock,” is the mechanism which requires a UN mandate, a government decision and Dáil approval to deploy Defence Forces (DF) personnel overseas. It is posited as a “legal guarantee of neutrality” and “the most significant legislative bulwark supporting Irish Neutrality” (PANA, 2022b).

Renata Dwan (2022) reasons that Ireland in wishing to pursue its interests as a “Global Island” in a changing international security environment, will be exposed to an “increasingly fractured and competitive international system”. Could Ireland risk becoming an outlier to the detriment of our foreign policy goals and economic well-being? Against the background outlined above, using a thematic approach, this paper attempts to answer the question, “Can Ireland’s model of neutrality remain aligned with its foreign policy ambitions amidst the re-emergence of war in Europe?”.

Literature Review

The chosen conceptual framework for the literature review, consists of a series of layers that examine neutrality from an initially broad focus of International Relations (IR) Theory, to debate on Ukraine and Irish Neutrality. The layered conceptual framework applies a deductive reasoning approach which is illustrated in Figure 1. Consequently, this section is divided into four key areas. International Relations Theory, The History of Neutrality, Ireland's Neutrality, and finally, recent debate on Irish Neutrality due to the war in Ukraine.

¹ Primary radar refers to a long-range military radar used to detect aircraft that are not visible to existing Irish civilian air traffic monitoring systems which require an aircraft to have in the first instance and then not turn off their transponder.




Figure 1. Deductive Conceptual Framework

The first part of this section will introduce International Relations (IR) Theory, providing a framework for the reader to understand the varying perspectives on Irish Neutrality. It will introduce the concepts of Realism and Liberalism and the approach of Social Constructivism. An understanding of these concepts is key to understanding proponent and opponent views of Irish Neutrality.

Having provided the reader with a framework to understand the varying perspectives on neutrality from IR Theory, the second part of the literature review focuses on the concept of neutrality itself. The history of neutrality from the nineteenth century to the present day is discussed which allows the introduction of key terms relevant to the research before narrowing our focus to discuss Irish Neutrality in part three.

Part three of this section builds on the previous parts to discuss Irish Neutrality up to the war in Ukraine. It will illustrate how Ireland's engagement internationally has been heavily influenced by its traditional policy of military neutrality and how the concept has evolved, particularly in response to Ireland's engagement with the European Union. Part three therefore provides the background and context for understanding how Irish Neutrality is now being discussed in the context of the War in Ukraine.

Part four will illustrate the re-emergence of debate on Irish Neutrality due to the war in Ukraine. It will highlight how proponents of neutrality feel that Irish Neutrality is being threatened, whereas opponents feel that the war in Ukraine serves to highlight the shortcomings of Ireland's neutrality policy in a lack of defence capability. The review of the literature concludes with a characterisation of Ireland's policy of neutrality from a synthesis of the four parts of the literature review. It concludes that questions are indeed arising for Ireland's policy of military neutrality, but with apparent contradictions existing between certain viewpoints and IR Theory, which is where Part 1 of this section begins.

International Relations Theory

Hamilton Fish Armstrong (1956) described the difficulties of applying a definition to the concept of neutrality when he said, “[n]eutrality means different things in different places and at different times. It can even mean different things in the same place and at approximately the same time”, similar can be said for a definition of IR Theory.

Brown & Ainley (2005, p.1) posit that one focus is on the “diplomatic and strategic relations of states” with regards to war, peace, conflict, and cooperation, with another focus on “cross border transactions” in political, economic, and social spheres. Both are relevant to a discussion on Irish Neutrality.

However, it is the paradigms of Realism, Liberalism, and the approach of Social Constructivism within the theoretical framework of IR theory, that will allow us to analyse Irish Neutrality and the thesis which asserts that, “[i]nstead of realist theories providing a persuasive argument for continued Irish Neutrality, liberal theories give us a better understanding” (Jesse, 2006, p. 24).

Realism

For the realist tradition, the state and its sovereignty are the sole objects of reference (Smith, 2015; Austin, 1998). Realism understands that states exist in a system in which interstate conflict is the primary source of insecurity, thus the international system is said to be anarchic. Realists assert this theory explains the world as it is, not as it should be, thus, all states, including neutral states, are responsible for their own security with the maintenance and development of military capability being the only method to achieve security in such a self-help system.

Challengers of realist views on neutrality argue that alternatives should be looked at to include the “non-realist ‘active’ concepts of neutrality”, positing that Liberalism and the approach of Social Constructivism explain the internal factors that influence neutrality, such as “values that may drive public support of [neutrality]” (Devine, 2006, p.32). As such, both Liberalism and Social Constructivism are discussed below.

Liberalism

Liberals are more optimistic than realists about the ability of states to avoid conflict through cooperation. Interstate conflict is seen as a possibility rather than an inevitability with the different strands of Liberalism focusing on how to reduce the possibility of interstate conflict. Smith (2015) and Jesse (2006) consider three strands of Liberalism. They are Internationalism, Institutionalism and Idealism.

Internationalism argues that a harmony of interests exist across state boundaries. An international order could be constructed based on these common interests, thus reducing, or eliminating, the structural problem that concerns realists known as the security dilemma, which arises when the attempts of one state to satisfy its security needs, however peaceful in intent, lead to rising insecurity for other states, all of whom interpret their own actions as defensive in character (Smith, 2015, p.23).

Institutionalism posits that international institutions, such as the UN, can and should be created with Idealism focusing on the domestic rights of the individual which links more with the approach of Social Constructivism.

Social Constructivism

Devine explains the social constructivist approach as one which studies the parts of IR Theory that Realism leaves out “encompassing moral objectives, co-operation, values, identity, and a human centred concept of security, the public or people being the referent object as opposed to the state” (Devine, 2006, p. 52). Cottey agrees that the social constructivist approach makes a persuasive case that the neutrality policies of the European neutral states have become an “important and established part of each country’s national identity” (Cottey, 2017, p.19).

A key point however by Cruz et al. (2020), is that neither Realism, Liberalism nor Social Constructivism is comprehensive enough in an increasingly complex international environment to stand alone, policymakers need to consider all of them when articulating security policy. However, there is another theoretical approach to be aware of in the current geopolitical context of the war in Ukraine, “Just War Theory.”

Just War Theory

Just War Theory (JWT), proposes, with certain conditions, that a state is always justified in defending itself (Skelly, 2001; Lottaz, 2022). Further, the theory espouses that when a war is just, the aggressor is at fault, therefore it is an act of injustice to passively support the unjust side. Neutrality, Lottaz (2022) observes, under any framework, is fundamentally challenged when war is set as the only viable or moral option. In that space, neutrality cannot remain credible which is extremely relevant in the context of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

Conclusion

The literature review above discussed the concepts of Realism and Liberalism along with the approach of Social Constructivism. Of these, Idealism, which focuses on the rights of the individual, brings the approach of Social Constructivism which Cottey (2017) believes makes a persuasive case for neutrality having become part of Ireland’s national Identity.

Jesse (2006, p.23) asserts that liberal theories provide a better understanding for continued Irish Neutrality when contrasted with realist theories which predict armed neutrality, and the utility of neutrality being linked to the existence of conflict. In the face of the predictions of Realism being actualised with the war in Ukraine and Irish reaction to same, JWT raises a question for Irish “liberal neutrality” (Jesse, 2006, p.23). Could pacifism provide a better understanding? Part two will develop this theme further through analysis of the history of neutrality and its associated concepts.

The History of Neutrality

Part two of the literature review discusses the history of neutrality and its main concepts. It will illustrate how collective security emerged because of the challenges the First World War

raised for the nineteenth century concept of neutrality. The outbreak of World War Two again challenged concepts of neutrality where the violation of many of the surviving neutrals from the First World War saw the disappearance of “Great Power Neutrality” and “Occasional Neutrality”, with “Non-Alignment” emerging as a concept alongside those permanently neutral states in the emerging bipolar order after World War Two. Part two concludes with a discussion on the credibility of neutrality suggesting that the realist position which sees the world as it is, rather than as it should be, is strengthened when one considers how neutrality has weakened as a concept with each major conflict, emphasising the importance of a credible defence in neutrality.

Neutrality in the “Long” Nineteenth Century

In the nineteenth century, neutrality was a position adopted only upon the outbreak of a conflict, a concept which existed up until the outbreak of the First World War hence the term “long nineteenth century” (Abbenhuis, 2014).

Neutrality in this period, was recognised primarily by legal definition and described as “the attitude of impartiality adopted by third states towards belligerents and recognised by belligerents, such attitudes creating rights and duties between the impartial states and the belligerents” (Oppenheim, 1912 cited in Lottaz, 2022, p.3). Neutrality ended if a country failed to uphold the international law of neutrality, which was implemented at the two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and in the London Declaration of 1909 to define the rights and duties of neutrals in time of war.

In the balance set out in the Hague Conferences between the right to wage war, or abstain from war, “the right to wage war tended to weigh more heavily” (Joenniemi, 1993). Germany's invasion of Belgium being the case in point of disregard shown by belligerents for neutrality agreements during the First World War which “reinforced to great powers that neutralisation was no longer a useful tool for stabilising world affairs” (Abbenhuis, 2014, p.242). Thus, collective security was to replace neutrality during the Interwar Period.

Neutrality in the Interwar Period

Although neutral Belgium and Luxembourg were invaded during the First World War, and others like the United States gave up their neutral status, neutrality survived as a concept. However, the collapse of the pre-war balance of power and the establishment of a collective security system challenged the nineteenth century concept of neutrality significantly (Joenniemi, 1993).

Established in 1919 to peacefully settle disputes between member nations, the League of Nations was associated with “sanctions, guarantees and pacts of mutual assistance” (Lacuileanu, 2006, p.287) between members and had “a chilling effect” on the development of neutrality (Lottaz, 2022, p.9). In a note to the Paris Peace Conference² the Swiss stated that, “It is undeniable that from the point of view of logic and pure reason, that neutrality and League of Nations are two mutually exclusive ideas” (Graham, 1927, p.360).

² The Paris Peace Conference was the formal meeting in 1919 and 1920 of the Allies after the end of World War One to set the peace terms for the defeated Central Powers. One of its major decisions was the creation of the League of Nations.

Nonetheless, the remaining European neutrals wished to reinforce and promote their nineteenth century concept of neutrality, a concept that the twentieth century environment of total war and collective security would fundamentally change. The words of Nicolas Politis, a diplomat and Greek representative to the League of Nations, were almost prophetic in the further decline of neutrality after the Second World War when he said, “either the spread of war excludes neutrality or neutrality suppresses war by making war practically impossible, the one will fatally kill the other” (Politis, 1935 cited in Abbenhuis, 2014, p.246).

Neutrality after the Second World War

Where the First World War was an example to neutrals that neutrality was no longer a tool in stabilising international affairs, Germany's invasion of the Netherlands in the Second World War, as well as its invasion of Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg and Norway, was to illustrate that “small state neutrality is only viable if the superpowers of the day deem it politically expedient to recognise and respect it” (Briffa, 2022, p.32). Consequently, the number of neutrals diminished.

The bipolar order that emerged after 1945 with NATO and the Warsaw Pact saw “great power neutrality” i.e. The United States, and “occasional neutrality”, where a country “declares neutrality in a particular war and only for the duration of that war” (Fischer et al, 2016, p.7), disappear as concepts. Only permanent neutrality remained popular after the formation of the UN (Lottaz, 2022, p.10).

Permanent Neutrality

Permanent neutrality does not depend on the existence of warfare at all, “permanent neutrals promise not to take anyone's side (under any circumstances) and to adjust their foreign and military policies accordingly, as not to create a situation in which they would be forced to join a war on one or the other side” (Lottaz, 2020, p.70), which he suggests, ties permanent neutrality to an environment of peace.

In addition, whether recognised in a legal sense or not, it is their refusal to join “alliance systems” which verifies this permanency (Lottaz, 2020, p.74). Switzerland became permanently neutral upon signing a multilateral agreement at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, as did Austria, born out of a declaration in 1955 which was followed by international recognition (Fischer et al, 2016). The Austrian example being famous as the exception to NATO's open-door policy of accession where guaranteeing Austria's permanent neutrality was seen to better strengthen European Security (Sestanovich, 2022).

Non – Alignment

Briffa writes, “It is important to note that neutrality is distinct from the other prominent hiding strategy of non-alignment” (2022, p.24). Vukadinovic provides a key point in this context that differentiates non-alignment from neutrality,

Non-aligned countries resolutely refused the policy of neutrality in international relations, emphasizing that they were not passive observers of international relations, but that they wanted to influence by their policy in international

relations, a new trend indicating the abolition of the bloc restraint and of the domination of great countries. (1971 cited in Briffa, 2022, p.24)

In the post-Cold War period, non-alignment “largely lost traction without bipolar strategic competition to anchor its focus” (Briffa, 2022, p.25). European neutrals such as Sweden, Finland, and Austria, who all joined the EU after the end of the Cold War in 1995, changed their neutrality policies to increase their cooperation and integration with organisations such as the EU and NATO and the UN (Goetschel, 2022, p.8), illustrating their “outward looking approach” in contrast to Switzerland (Fischer et al, 2016, p.10).

Conclusion

Keatinge (1984) suggests that the continued existence of a neutrality policy is dependent not only on one's ability to defend neutrality, but also on skilful diplomacy to present a credible policy. The impact of First and Second World Wars on neutrality illustrate the point that diplomacy alone is not enough. Defence capability is required as part of a credible neutrality policy. As Salmon contends, “the credibility and viability of neutrality presuppose a strong independent defence” (1989, p.105), solidifying again the realist perspective on neutrality. In the modern context of the War in Ukraine the prophetic words of Nicolas Politis seem relevant once more with Sweden and Finland’s move into NATO.

Lottaz (2022, cited in Bruno, 2022) says that neutrality is always successful when it “either serves the interests of all parties or at least doesn’t appear as an existential threat to any of them”. Just the First and Second World Wars illustrated that small state neutrality is only viable if others deem it politically expedient to recognise and respect it, weaknesses in Irish defence capability have raised suggestions of the credibility of Irish Neutrality in the context of the re-emergence of traditional conflict in Europe. Therefore, part three will firstly discuss the background to Irish Neutrality before discussing recent debate on Irish Neutrality from the War in Ukraine.

Ireland’s Neutrality

Part Two of the Literature review introduced key concepts and terminology relevant to discussing Irish Neutrality and highlighted how history has shown the requirement for a credible defence, which Ireland lacks. Part three will illustrate how Ireland's engagement internationally has been heavily influenced by its traditional policy of military neutrality and how the concept has evolved, particularly in response to Ireland's engagement with the EU. This provides the background and context for understanding how Irish Neutrality is being discussed in the context of the War in Ukraine.

World War Two and the United Nations

Ireland adopted a position of neutrality during the Second World War which, from a security policy perspective was arguably successful, even though it went relatively unchallenged owing to the benefits of fortunate geography. However, Ireland's neutrality was not without consequences, being geopolitically isolated after the war. Kitano highlights “Ireland was not invited to participate in the San Francisco conference in 1945 to establish the United Nations” (2020, p.198) owing to its wartime neutrality. But despite Ireland's wishes to end its isolation which it sought to resolve through UN Membership, concerns persisted about the

compatibility of neutrality and UN membership in the evolving Cold War bipolar order of the 1950s (Skelly, 1996, p.71).

Membership of the UN was eventually gained in 1955, Ireland's wishes to join having been blocked in 1946 by the Soviet Union exercising its veto as a permanent member. Murphy (2002, p.18) highlights Ireland being one of only three countries that opposed Soviet admission to the League of Nations in 1934 as the real reason for the Soviet Veto.

Irish Neutrality and the European Union

The issue of neutrality arose again concerning Ireland's bid to join the European Economic Community (EEC). In contrast to Ireland, other European neutrals such as Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland regarded the EEC commitment as being incompatible with neutrality but "when confronted with this line, in general, Irish politicians learned to look the other way" (Keatinge, 2019, p.5).

Taoiseach Sean Lemass let it be known in 1961 that if it were necessary, neutrality would be trumped by the imperative of economic policy (Keatinge, 2019; Jesse, 2007; Fitzgerald, 1998). Lemass then went on to say in 1962 that "[w]e recognise that a military commitment will be an inevitable consequence of our joining the Common Market" (Fitzgerald, 2000, p.14).

Ireland became a member of the EEC in 1973 where, arguably, economic benefits trumped both politician's and the electorate's concerns about Irish Neutrality which were found to be minimal as "the Irish electorate overwhelmingly supported joining the EEC with 83% voting in favour and 17% voting against" (Kitano, 2020, p.199). It was not until 1982 that neutrality emerged to the forefront again with an invocation of Irish Neutrality by Charles Haughey during the Falklands War.

Irish Neutrality as Policy

The Irish government initially supported the UK against Argentina's invasion of the Falklands. Sitting on the UN Security Council at the time, Ireland voted in favour of a UK sponsored UN resolution and was requested to support the UK government's calls for EEC sanctions against Argentina. However, on 4 May 1982, in response to the escalation of the conflict, Ireland decided it would take a neutral stance on the Falklands and seek the withdrawal of EEC sanctions.

Despite UK protest, Taoiseach Charles Haughey made a statement in the Dáil where he stated that Ireland had decided to "reassert our traditional policy of neutrality" (Haughey, 1982). The change was criticised in the Dáil being viewed as a "ploy" (Fitzgerald, 1982) and Kelly suggests ample proof demonstrates "Haughey's decision-making process was driven by an opportunistic and deep-rooted anti-British attitude" (Kelly, 2022, p.47). The episode led to a dramatic shift in Anglo Irish relations.

The period of the mid-90s, saw the establishment of Government views on neutrality in policy that shape Irish engagement in security and defence matters to this day. EU member states obligations included a commitment to the "progressive framing of a common union defence policy" (Keatinge, 2019, p.1) and Ireland wanted "to be positive and constructive to

these cooperation mechanisms” (Kitano, 2020, p.200) without reaching into anything that could be considered a collective defence.

EU Member states obligations regarding security and defence were therefore qualified by the statement that they “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policies of certain member states” (Keatinge, 2019, p.1). But just as the Maastricht, Nice and Lisbon treaties did, decisions on NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) prompted similar concerns from opposition parties and small but active interest groups.

Doherty explains that “that those opposed to Irish membership of PFP claimed that the treaty marked a further step in the steady erosion of neutrality and that it strengthened the EU’s links with nuclear weapons-based groups” (2002, cited in Burke, 2004, p.11).

Similarly, with those opposed to PESCO, which was established in 2017 to increase defence cooperation between EU members by increasing the capabilities and interoperability of armed forces in the EU where Flynn suggests,

Much of the subsequent controversy in the Dáil seems to have been based on the assumption among some opposition TDs that PESCO inevitably leads to a common EU defence or the much-mythologised EU army. (Flynn, 2018, p.78)

The response Tonra (2012) asserts, as the Government was required to emphasise to the public after their rejection of the Nice and Lisbon treaties, that their acceptance of the treaties would not affect Ireland's policy of neutrality, they “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policies of certain member states”, was to create a pragmatic definition for Irish Neutrality. “Military Neutrality, embodied by non-participation in military alliances” (DFA 1996, cited in Tonra, 2013a, p.156). Thus Ireland’s “flexible neutrality” (Leahy, 2023).

Conclusion

The discussion above illustrates that concerns about neutrality arise, or are used, in nearly any discussion on issues of security and defence, particularly with the EU. Overlooking the Falklands episode, Cottey (2022, p.7) describes Ireland's engagement in European security and defence matters since 1973 as “good citizenship but cautious engagement” rooted in concerns about neutrality. Consequently, the Government policy response has been to create a pragmatic definition that sets the bar for breaching Irish Neutrality to an “exceptionally high level” (Tonra, 2012, p.4).

Just as neutrality concerns in the past are illustrated through the defeat of the Nice and Lisbon treaties, requiring guarantees on neutrality to be given, in the present, these concerns have arisen again in the context of Irish involvement in the support of Ukraine. Principal amongst those concerns has been the discussion on Ireland's Triple Lock mechanism. Therefore, Part four will discuss the recent debate on Ireland's policy of neutrality in the context of the War in Ukraine.

The Ukraine War and debate on Irish neutrality

Part three discussed the background to Irish Neutrality since World War Two and highlighted how concerns about neutrality almost always arise in discussions on security and defence in

Ireland, particularly regards the EU. This has been clearly illustrated in debate on Irish Neutrality since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, at the forefront of which, has been Irish defence capability, but also the subject of the Triple Lock.

The Triple Lock

The “Triple Lock” is the mechanism which requires a UN mandate, a government decision and Dáil approval³ to deploy DF personnel overseas. A fundamental flaw in the mechanism being it effectively allows any member of the P5 a veto on the deployment of the Irish Defence forces. As a term, it has its genesis in the Nice Treaty, described by Tonra (2013b) as a “rhetorical trope” devised during the Nice referendum to reassure the public that its “participation in the European Union's common foreign and security policy does not prejudice its traditional policy of military neutrality” (Department of An Taoiseach, 2002). Comments by Simon Coveney that a “move away from the Triple Lock would be a sensible change, not a radical change” (O’Halloran, 2022), are seen as part of the erosion of neutrality by its proponents.

Context of the current Triple Lock Debate

Dwan (2022) & De Conning (2021, p.216) highlight that there have been no new UN Missions since 2014. Dwan further highlights an increasing realisation, that after Ukraine, agreement in the UN Security Council (UNSC) will be all the harder. It is on this point Schmitt (2005, cited in Bachiu, 2020, p.118) raises another important point on the UNSC and the “Triple Lock”, stating, “If we apply a definition of sovereignty in which the ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ the UN can be argued to be more sovereign than the Irish state”.

The issues of sovereignty of decision-making, and consensus at the UNSC, have been noted by the Government. Speaking in the Seanad⁴, Minister Coveney set out the current situation regards the Triple Lock stating, “we could, potentially, be prevented from sending Irish peacekeepers to parts of the world that could benefit significantly from such intervention by a veto being used in the Security Council” (Coveney, 2022).

Speaking then on Ireland's security policy, including neutrality, he stated,

It is about a practical and sensible approach to ensuring Ireland can protect its sovereignty, make a contribution in other parts of the world in the context of peacekeeping and peace enforcement and make a credible contribution towards the security of the European Union. (Coveney, 2022)

A motion that called on the Government to remove the “Triple Lock” mechanism and replace it with a double lock mechanism requiring only Government and Dáil⁵ approval was proposed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence and accepted at the Fine Gael Ard Fheis in November 2022 (O’Halloran, 2022). These statements prompted reaction from proponents of neutrality for whom the Triple Lock is seen as a “legal guarantee of neutrality” (PANA,

³ Parliament majority.

⁴ The Seanad is the Irish Senate, it acts as the upper house of the Irish Parliament with the Dáil being the lower house.

⁵ Parliament majority.

2022b) such as Sinn Féin, who stated it was an attempt to “undermine protections put in place to preserve neutrality” (Brady, 2022c).

Freeriding and the Credibility of Neutrality

Part two of the literature review highlighted that defence capability is required as part of a credible neutrality policy or as Salmon contends, “the credibility and viability of neutrality presuppose a strong independent defence” (1989, p.105). However, PANA, the “Irish Neutrality League” and “People Before Profit”, do not see the justification for planned increases in military expenditure outlined by the CODF and approved by Government.

PANA believe the increases have nothing to do with defending Ireland, but with “participation in NATO and EU wars abroad without a UN Mandate” (PANA, 2022b, p.8). People before Profit TD’s have stated they are “totally opposed to massive increases in spending on arms and the weapons of war” (Barry, 2022) and that “the proposed increase [from the CODF] of up to €2 billion in military spending is totally unacceptable” (PBP, 2022b). However, Sinn Féin, in contrast to other proponents of neutrality, state that “central to our neutrality lies the capacity of our Defence Forces to defend our neutrality from threat” (Brady, 2022b).

In contrast to the vocal left, it is interesting to note that the literature highlights no anti-neutrality or Pro-NATO lobby or much commentary on neutrality at all. A point is made by Drea (2022) that “prevarication” by the Government on neutrality is commonplace, explained by Cottey (2022, p.6) where he suggests “there are few political incentives” to counter argue the vocal left.

Free-riding is recognised as a common phenomenon in security studies. Free-riding, Cottey (2022) explains, is where “states benefit from a good provided collectively by a group of states but only contribute in a limited way, if at all, to the costs of providing that collective good” (Cottey, 2022, p.6).

EU members of NATO have long been accused of free-riding on the United States (Bergmann and Haddad, 2021), notably during the Trump presidency leading to a “growing consensus that Europe can no longer continue to rely on the US for security” (Barret, 2020, p.163). Cottey (2022, p.6) suggests that freeriding has been a successful national security policy for Ireland since the 1930s. He argues that Ireland has achieved the aims of a security policy, whilst having devoted only “very limited resources.” Cottey however also suggests that a policy of freeriding is a result of circumstances which allow such a stance rather than a “deliberate national policy or strategy” (2022, p.5).

Suggesting differently, Lee (2021) writes of T.K. Whittaker, former Secretary General of the Department of Finance, who when asked why Ireland was “underfunding defence in comparison to other EEC member states” replied, “this was government policy” it is “a gamble if you like on peace” (Lee, 2021). This view being further strengthened perhaps amidst recent revelations of an alleged deal with the RAF to defend Irish airspace since the 1950s (Leahy, 2023).

Drea (2022) opines that Ireland appears to feel little security obligation to its European partners, arguing this reflects Dublin’s views of EU membership in purely transactional

economic terms, as Keatinge (2019) and Kitano (2020) asserted in Part 3. Drea (2022) further asserts Irish Neutrality as “political cover for neglect”. McNamara summarises best perhaps when he states,

Neutrality’s domestic supporters will insist that sovereignty and independence continue to be protected by military non-alignment, but, over recent decades, government complacency has then undermined the independent defence capacities that safeguard Ireland's sovereignty and independence. (McNamara, 2023 p.386)

Literature Review. Summary

Part one discussed IR Theory, closing with JWT which says, it is an act of injustice to passively support an aggressor through neutrality with recent discussions on Irish Neutrality and the war in Ukraine putting this in context. JWT would suggest that realist theories should now impact thinking on Irish Neutrality. If not, considering how neutrality has become part of Ireland's national identity, the question arises whether pacifism better explains elements of continued Irish Neutrality.

This view is compounded in part two, where both World Wars have shown that diplomacy without defence capability is not enough to maintain a credible neutrality policy. Neutrality is only viable if others recognise it, with weaknesses in Irish defence capability raising questions for the credibility of neutrality.

Part three provided the background to Irish Neutrality from the Second World War through to today where Ireland’s engagement on security and defence matters has been characterised by cautious engagement and a policy definition that sets the bar for breaching neutrality to an exceptionally high level. To borrow from Leahy (2023) Irish neutrality is “flexible”.

Even though the credibility of Irish Neutrality today is being challenged, just as neutrality as a concept was during the interwar period and post-World War Two, part four illustrated the tendency for Irish Neutrality to be accepted by some as axiomatic just as Salmon (1989, p.51) cautioned, particularly by left leaning political parties and interest groups.

The literature suggests the credibility of Irish Neutrality is challenged due to a lack of defence capacity from government complacency, a consequence of freeriding, or as suggested by TK Whitaker, that freeriding is in fact government policy.

It is clear from a review of the literature how questions would arise as to how neutrality can remain aligned with Ireland’s foreign policy ambitions. The next section will provide findings on key areas that have emerged from the literature review to answer the main research question.

The table below lists the interviewees who took part in the research.

Political Interviewees	Government Interviewees	Academic, Journalistic and Interest Group Interviewees
Barry Andrews , Member of European Parliament.	Dermot Ryan , Principal Officer, International Security and Defence Policy Branch, Department of Defence.	Dr Brendan Flynn , Assistant Professor, University of Galway.
Clare Daly , Member of European Parliament.	David Bruck , Director, International Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs.	Roger Cole , Chairman, Peace and Neutrality Alliance.
Richard Boyd Barret , Teachta Dála.	Noel Dorr , Former Secretary General, Department of Foreign Affairs.	Connor Gallagher , Author & Crime and Security Correspondent for the Irish Times.
Cathal Berry , Teachta Dála & Retired DF Commandant.		
Interviewee Selection: Interviewees were sought who are an authority on Irish Neutrality in their respective areas across society, having been identified with the aid of document analysis in the Literature review. The participants standing as elite interviewees contributes to adding credibility to their insights and opinions as well the author's commitment to examine and present a diverse range of perspectives on the subject.		

Table 1 – List of Interviewees

Firstly, the above mentioned interviewees understanding of neutrality as a concept will be contrasted with their views on Irish Neutrality. Secondly, interviewees opinion on whether the changing EU security landscape requires Ireland to re-evaluate its policy of neutrality and to what end. Thirdly, Irish defence capability and Irish assistance to Ukraine is discussed to ascertain if pacifism better describes proponents' views on Irish Neutrality. Finally, the Triple Lock is discussed to assess if it can remain aligned with neutrality and Irelands foreign policy ambitions.

Research Findings

This section presents the findings of the research from interviews with key figures in the Irish Neutrality debate identified through document analysis and contrasted where relevant to text and document analysis. Four key areas emerged with contrasting views between proponents and opponents which suggest that pacifism better describes proponents' model of neutrality. Figure 2 illustrates how this chapter develops from the Literature review utilising an inductive approach.




Figure 2- Deductive to Inductive Conceptual Framework

Neutrality as a Concept

Armstrong (1956) stated, “Neutrality means different things, in different places and at different times”. Therein lies a significant part of the challenge of answering the main research question, what is Ireland's model of neutrality?

This first section lays out findings regarding the understanding of neutrality as a concept amongst the various research participants before contrasting with Ireland's “policy” of neutrality.

The Proponent Concept of Neutrality

There was consensus amongst proponents, (Daly, Barret & Cole, 2023) that neutrality means “not getting involved in wars” with an additional theme of “not taking sides” connected to Anti-Imperialism. On first inspection, proponent views resemble nineteenth century concepts of neutrality posited by Abbenhuis (2014), however, Daly (2023) sees neutrality as “the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, dialogue and diplomacy”. While a view that arguably aligns with Article 29 of the Constitution⁶, it also aligns with a “permanent neutrality” concept “where the neutral idea is intimately tied to an environment of peace” (Lottaz, 2020, p.72).

Amongst participants on the “opponent”⁷ side, there was a different understanding.

⁶Article 29 sets out the principles that guide the conduct of Ireland’s values-based foreign policy “The ideals of peace and friendly cooperation amongst nations, founded on international justice and morality; adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

⁷ The term “Opponent” is used throughout this thesis as the antithesis to “proponent” of neutrality, to broadly describe a sliding scale of those completely opposed to neutrality as well as those who may only be critical of some or most facets of Irish Neutrality.

The Opponent Concept of Neutrality

Berry (2023) stated, “[a]s a general rule, you wait for the conflict to break out and declare yourself neutral in that conflict”, reflecting “occasional neutrality” (Fischer et al, 2016).

Flynn described his view of neutrality as the “customary international law understanding” (Flynn 2023) of neutrality from the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the strict adherence to the rights and duties prescribed within. Similarly, Andrews (2023) understanding of neutrality aligned with Flynn’s but particularly Berry, in emphasising “the ability to protect oneself from attack” as a requirement for a state to be “properly” neutral (Andrews, 2023).

Gallagher (2023) expressed the opinion that neutrality, “depends on what words you put before it” highlighting qualifiers such as “permanent”, “occasional”, and “active” neutrality as described by Lottaz (2020, p.70) and Fischer et al (2016, p.7). However, as will be shown, “proponents” of Irish Neutrality do not use qualifiers such as “occasional” or “permanent,” only describing the concept as being “Neutral.”

Neutrality as a Concept - Findings

All participants drew some connection between neutrality and conflict, “not getting involved in wars” (Daly, Barret & Cole, 2023), but for proponents, neutrality primarily means “not taking sides” (Daly, 2023). Proponents emphasise a permanent neutrality concept posited by Lottaz (2020), as an enabler for diplomacy and peaceful resolution of disputes that is not contingent on the existence of conflict.

In contrast, opponents emphasised a symbiotic relationship between neutrality and conflict. Neutrality is emphasised as a status one maintains during a conflict or, absent conflict, it is a status one maintains by preserving the capability to defend that status by force, if necessary. Opponent neutrality concepts then are more closely aligned with 19th century concepts outlined by Abbenhuis (2014) like “occasional” neutrality as described by Fischer et al (2017).

The second section describes the participant's views on the Irish definition of neutrality and contrasts with their view of neutrality as a concept.

The Irish Definition of Neutrality

Ireland has a “policy” of neutrality defined by the Department of Foreign Affairs as “a policy of military neutrality, characterised by non-membership of military alliances or common or mutual defence arrangements” (DFA, 2022).

The research participants were asked if “Irish Neutrality,” considering the above definition, differed from their understanding of neutrality as a concept. Proponents and opponents disagree with the Irish policy definition, but for different reasons.

The Proponent View

On the proponent side, Daly (2023) described the Irish definition as a “fudge”, stating that “the political establishment has been embarrassed by Ireland's neutrality since Ireland joined

the EU” and that “real neutrality has to be more than non-military participation” (Daly, 2023) again reflecting Lottaz’s (2020) concept of neutrality being tied to peace.

Barret also voiced concern with the current definition and “the playing with terminology” citing Michael Martin’s statement “we’re not politically neutral, we’re not morally neutral” (Martin, 2022), asserting in response that “we’re just neutral” (Barret, 2023).

Cole (2023) asserts that Irish Neutrality “is deeply rooted in Irish independence and opposition to imperialism whether that be British imperialism, American imperialism or European imperialism”. Like Cole, Barret (2023) described Irish Neutrality as meaning “we’re not aligning with big political military blocs, particularly those dominated by imperial powers” echoing the explanation of “Non – alignment” by Briffa (2022).

Daly, like Cole, also asserted Irish Neutrality’s origin in the Irish struggle for independence and “in that sense not siding with the oppressor” (Daly, 2023) although paradoxically, Daly also asserted “if you don’t take sides if you’re demonstrably neutral then you can command the ear of all belligerents in a conflict” (Daly, 2023). This dichotomy was also evident in Barrett’s understanding where he stated, “[i]t seems to me neutrality means saying we stand out against all these big Imperial blocs and we maintain our historical identification with the oppressed ones” (Barrett, 2023).

While proponents of Irish Neutrality agree on one hand that “neutrality” means “not taking sides” (Daly, 2023), paradoxically, it is also possible to take the side of the oppressed and be neutral. While a morally correct position and one that aligns with Ireland’s values-based approach to international relations, it could not be considered a “neutral” position.

This has emerged as an interesting finding which will be expanded upon further below.

The Opponent View

Berry (2023), while emphasising that Irish Neutrality is a policy, emphasised that the definition was absent a “second part of the equation that is never mentioned”, this being the “obligation piece”. The Irish definition of neutrality does not clarify, that along with non-membership of military alliances or collective defence arrangements, comes an “obligation to protect your airspace, territorial waters, landmass and cyberspace” (Berry, 2023). Equally, Berry expanded, there is no obligation for anyone to assist us in protecting those domains.

Andrews (2023) is more absolute in his explanation of Irish Neutrality. For Andrews, “neutrality means impartiality in the treatment of both belligerents” and he states that this was not the case in World War Two and it is not the case either with Ireland’s actions in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Andrews further states that “we have an explicit agreement with the Royal Air Force to patrol our skies” and “we allow US military planes to refuel at Shannon,” asserting that both scenarios “impinge on our neutrality” (Andrews, 2023).

For Gallagher (2023), the word neutrality itself is the “wrong word for Ireland”. He proposes that the term “non-aligned” would be better, even though that term does not reflect the fact that Ireland is very much aligned with the West, a point that was echoed by the Taoiseach on 24 March 2023 when he stated “[w]e’ve always been on the side of the

West, on the side of democracy and on the side of freedom. And that's particularly the case now that we're facing this war in Ukraine" (Leahy & Gallagher, 2023).

Bruck's view aligns with Gallagher's as does Flynn's. Though inserting the qualifier "military" to "non-alignment," Bruck states,

I think the reality of our policy, it would actually and probably is better described as military non-alignment, because that's actually, fundamentally what our policy consists of, choosing not to be a member of a particular military alliance. (Bruck, 2023)

Flynn (2023) agrees, stating "[p]eople think we have a policy of neutrality, but in fact, all we have is a policy of non-alignment". Ryan (2023) provides the concluding point, and one that is salutary to note, that international colleagues "do look at us with a degree of incredulity" when Ireland claims to be militarily neutral whilst providing training for the Ukrainian armed forces under the EU military assistance mission to Ukraine (EUMAM).

Thus, both sides of the debate would agree that neither the Irish definition nor the current practices describe neutrality. Where they differ is in how that paradox should be addressed. The following section develops this point in summarising opponent and proponent views on the definition of Irish Neutrality.

Findings – The Definition of Irish Neutrality

Opponents and proponents agree that neither the current definition nor certain policy decisions reflect neutrality, but their views diverge on how Irish Neutrality should be described and enacted.

On aligning views, Andrews (2023), speaking from an opponent perspective, highlighted the incompatibility of policy decisions such as Ireland's support for Ukraine and the refuelling of US military aircraft in Shannon with his understanding of neutrality, issues which proponents like Cole (2023) also cited. This again reflects opponents focus on nineteenth century concepts such as the rights and duties of neutrals (Abbenhuis, 2014).

Regards contrasting views, for proponents; Irish Neutrality appears ideological as cautioned by Salmon (1989, p.51), rooted in an anti-imperialist sentiment of "not siding with the oppressor" (Daly, 2023) and thus is simultaneously paradoxical when considering proponents' stance of "not taking sides".

Proponents also take issue with the language of the Irish definition, describing the Irish definition as a "fudge" (Daly, 2023) and stating that "that we are just neutral" (Barret, Cole, 2023). Neither would proponents accept the term "non-aligned" though their own description (Barret & Cole, 2023) fits the definition.

Flynn (2023) provides the rationale stating people use the expression "we are neutral" supporting Cottey's (2017, p.19) conclusion that neutrality has become part of Ireland's national identity. Further, it aligns with Salmon's (1989, p.51) warning of neutrality being "accepted internally as axiomatic" and solidifies the earlier-mentioned assertion that proponents would not use qualifiers such as "militarily" or "politically" neutral.

While opponents agree that the policy choices noted above by Andrews (2023) are incompatible with neutrality, their opposition lies in those policy choices being “labelled” neutral, rather than the policy choices themselves. In essence, the opponent position is that Irish Neutrality in both language and behaviour would be better described as non-alignment or “military non-alignment” (Bruck, 2023).

This simplifies the opponent argument somewhat as Berry (2023) contends there is an obligation to be “self-sufficient” and this applies whether one chooses neutrality, the more pragmatic non-alignment, or an alliance, an argument which proponents largely disagree with. The next section will highlight findings on this equally divergent view.

The Changing European Security Landscape

The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered massive changes in the European security landscape raising questions for Ireland's policy of neutrality, the Triple Lock and Ireland's defence capability, all questions which were set to be discussed in a consultative forum announced by the Tánaiste in which it was hoped to “build a deeper level of understanding of the threats faced by the State” (McQuinn, 2023).

In that context, participants were asked whether that changing landscape required Ireland to re-evaluate its policy of neutrality.

Re-evaluating Irish Neutrality – The Proponent position

Cole (2023) stated that the Government do not wish to revise the policy of neutrality, “they want to abolish neutrality”. He asserted that there have been “attacks on neutrality” since the war in Ukraine began in a process of steadily eroding neutrality despite “overwhelming support for Irish Neutrality” (Cole, 2023) citing the results of a 15th April 2022 Irish Times IPSOS poll⁸.

Echoing what Armstrong (1956) identified, Gallagher makes an interesting observation on opinion polls considering the lack of discussion of security issues in Ireland when he states, “there's probably eight different versions of neutrality, to those people you know, what is neutrality?” (Gallagher, 2023). Flynn, on the same point, asserts that while two-thirds of the population identify with neutrality “it's very nebulous what that is” (Flynn, 2023).

Daly and Barret would agree with Cole, that there is a “concerted, systematic policy of trying to edge us away from neutrality” (Barret, 2023), and that the way the media have portrayed the war in Ukraine “has certainly probably eroded support for neutrality” (Daly, 2023).

Against this backdrop, proponents were unanimous in asserting the requirement for what would be described as “permanent unarmed neutrality”, by enshrining neutrality in the constitution, and rejecting the opponent requirement for “self-sufficiency” in revising Ireland's policy of neutrality in this new security landscape.

⁸ The Irish Times IPSOS poll stated that, “66 per cent of respondents said they supported the current model of neutrality, while 24 per cent said they would like to see it change” (Leahy & McLaughlin, 2022).

Revaluating Irish Neutrality – The Opponent Position

On the opponent side, Berry and Andrews (2023) agree that as circumstances change you should constantly re-evaluate your policies, particularly Andrews (2023) who suggests if one considers World War One, “the nature of our world and of wars, has changed massively” as now “malevolent actors can attack in a plethora of different ways, with new targets and with new weapons” (Andrews, 2023).

As posited by Gallagher earlier, Andrews stressed, citing Rooney, C. and Cogan, C (2022), that “polling shows confusion around what neutrality truly means, what Ireland currently does, and what membership of the EU entails”. To combat this, he suggests “we need a concrete, fact-based debate on what our neutrality means” (Andrews, 2023).

There is consensus amongst others on this point. Gallagher suggests that the first thing required “is to have that conversation to decide what type of neutrality we want, and what that means to us” (Gallagher, 2023). Bruck offers a similar view, but states,

The real question is not about the value in neutrality or otherwise. To get there, we have to at least start off by understanding what is the international geopolitical context? What is the threat environment? And then what are the options, which aren't just neutrality, yes or no. (Bruck, 2023)

In terms of options, Flynn suggests that the “conversation should move towards adopting non-alignment, rather than neutrality. Non-alignment, Flynn suggests, would provide “flexibility, but it also gives you the protection of choosing your level of involvement very carefully” which he states is “the quintessence of small state sovereignty” (Flynn, 2023).

On the option of permanent neutrality, Dorr highlights the incompatibility of a constitutional commitment to “permanent neutrality” owing to Ireland's membership of the United Nations which “all of the world's states including Ireland, have accepted under the UN Charter; and that Article 103⁹ of the Charter requires them to give precedence to the latter” (Dorr, 2023).

Berry's view is that “self-sufficiency” is important. “If you want to be neutral you have to resource it” (Berry, 2023). Dorr agrees suggesting “we should take steps to improve our military forces to a reasonable degree” and stating that “the case would seem to be stronger if we were to adopt a formal stance of permanent neutrality” (Dorr, 2023). Bruck summarises best when he states,

The world is not always going to be as we would like it to be, so in a context where we still fight for our values, to fight to promote and defend the rules-based international order, how do we then protect our interests in that context? (Bruck, 2023)

While the principal opponent view on re-evaluating Irish Neutrality is on a requirement for a pedagogical approach to several factors including neutrality, self-

⁹ Article 103 of the United Nations Charter provides that “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”.

sufficiency being among those, the proponent position is unequivocal, Irish Neutrality should be permanent and unarmed. Before developing that point in a later section on “pacifism or neutrality?”, it is necessary to discuss the Triple Lock which is intimately linked to proponent neutrality views.

The Triple Lock

Proponents are adamant that the Triple Lock, which constrains Ireland’s deployment of its armed forces overseas must remain. Proponents see it as a mechanism which constrains the government's use of the military and is therefore vital to their model of Irish Neutrality.

Cole states that “removing the Triple Lock essentially destroys totally any remnant of Irish Neutrality that exists” (Cole, 2023). Daly, and Barret, acknowledge that the UN has its problems, but Daly asserts “it is the best and the only thing we have in terms of an international multilateral coming together of the dis-united Nations” (Daly, 2023). Similarly, Barret asserts,

At least it's a check and balance against what I think is the agenda, particularly of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, which is to align us more closely with NATO, because if the UN is imperfect, to my mind, NATO is a hell of a lot more imperfect. (Barret, 2023)

However, asked how a country can be neutral while allowing other countries a veto prohibiting the deployment of peacekeepers, Barret admitted that was a “tricky question” but explained the answer pointed to a need for UN reform, stating, “I think it is wrong that the five biggest powers in the world are permanent members with a Veto” (Barret, 2023).

In contrast, the opponent side pointed to the need for reform of the Triple Lock rather than the UN. There was consensus on the point that the Triple Lock is an abdication of sovereignty with Andrews stating that,

The Triple Lock leaves an important element of Ireland’s foreign policy in the hands of aggressors, the absolute opposite of what was intended. This is completely inappropriate and should be brought to an end. (Andrews, 2023)

Ryan agreed that there are important questions around sovereignty and the Triple Lock but importantly, as Dwan (2022) highlighted, there has been “a significant tapering off of the number of new or renewed UN mandates or Security Council mandates” (Ryan, 2023). That reduction itself raises questions for the future of peacekeeping, a key element of Ireland's foreign policy.

Finally, Bruck (2023) asserted on the Triple Lock that,

There are ways you can find those checks and balances appropriately, and other countries managed to find those means both in terms of their own domestic situation and parliamentary oversight and procedures. (Bruck, 2023).

In terms of viable solutions and in keeping with other countries, opponents suggest a double lock with both Government and Dáil Approval being necessary. A simple majority Berry (2023) suggests is all that should be required, but you could “in theory, say we’ll increase it to a supermajority”.

In conclusion, it is not clear how the Triple Lock can remain in line with Ireland's foreign policy goals, such as peacekeeping, when it could jeopardise them further. Nor is it clear how the Triple Lock aligns with proponents' model of neutrality by allowing another country a veto on sovereign decisions. However, the findings in the next section from discussion on Irish defence capability and Irish assistance to Ukraine expand on this and suggests that the proponent position better describes pacifism than neutrality and hence why the Triple Lock is vital to proponents.

Pacifism or Neutrality?

Unlike occasional neutrality, permanent neutrality does not require a state of conflict to exist. There is an argument that this "intimately ties the neutral idea to an environment of peace" (Lottaz, 2020, p.72). This view aligns with Daly (2023) and others that we should act as mediators in international disputes. Opponents would argue this has little to do with neutrality as it describes Ireland's values based foreign policy approach. However, proponents seem to take neutrality to what Lottaz calls "it's extreme, renouncing even their militaries" (Lottaz, 2020, p.72) compounding Flynn's belief that "people think neutrality is pacifism and anti-militarism" (Flynn, 2023).

In response to questions on whether and how Ireland should revise its policy of neutrality, the unanimous proponent position was that Irish Neutrality should be permanent and unarmed. This section will highlight the dichotomy of the proponent position and suggest that their model of permanent neutrality better aligns with pacifism.

Pacifism

Voorhoeve (1982) wrote of a "pacifist and neutralist tendency" taking shape in Europe during the Cold War and argued it could have catastrophic consequences for the defence of Western Europe. The author contends this viewpoint is relevant again in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Voorhoeve suggests three different definitions relevant to this discussion.

General Pacifism "is not dogmatic but generally critical about defence spending and prefers to reduce the defence effort." Utilitarian Pacifism "deems violence to be an ineffective means to attain desirable goals and emphasises the possibilities of non-violent means to counter tyranny and exploitation." Selective Pacifism is "where the attitude towards violence depends on the ideological situation" (Voorhoeve, 1982, p.15). Each definition will be shown to explain elements of proponent's concept of Irish Neutrality.

Defence Capability

Cole (2023) quoted The Hague Conventions of 1907 in explaining his preference for permanent neutrality, citing US landings at Shannon, and stating that "you can't allow your territory to be used by countries involved in wars" (Cole, 2023). However, when asked of the obligation "for neutrals to prevent, by force, if necessary, belligerents to move troops or arms, form forces or recruit forces on a neutrals territory" (Hague, 1907) Cole stated, "we are an island off another island, a bigger island, and they [England] are the only people who ever invaded us" (Cole 2023).

When asked if the Hague Conventions inferred a requirement in international law to police neutral Irish airspace, as Swiss law similarly requires, Cole stated "[y]ou'd have to

explain to the Irish people why we're not building enough houses because we have to spend money on an air defence system" (Cole, 2023). While the Hague conventions clearly conflict with a concept of unarmed neutrality, paradoxically the elements that do not, remain relevant to proponents of "permanent unarmed neutrality."

When asked about his bill to enshrine neutrality in the constitution and a requirement to invest in the military to enforce that neutrality, Barret (2023) urged caution on what he thinks is "another agenda" in increasing military spending, in "pulling ourselves closer to NATO" (Barret, 2023). But the answer is better reflected in PBP's policy on defence which states "People Before Profit support the greater use of the defence forces as an effective and efficient super civil defence organisation" (PBP, 2022a).

Daly's view echoed PBPs policy document when she stated that any increase in military spending for Ireland "should be in a sort of aid to the civil power, protection of our coast from the fisheries point of view, because in the era of nuclear weapons, who is going to invade Ireland anyway" (Daly, 2023).

Daly further stated a "small country can never defend itself militarily, it's an absolute impossibility, all it can do is hope for a view like a non-involvement or a neutral clause is the best protection in that regard" (Daly, 2023).

Proponent views on increasing Ireland's defence capability therefore suggest a position better defined as general pacifism "which is not dogmatic but generally critical about defence spending and prefers to reduce the defence effort" (Voorhoeve, 1982, p.15). The next section will discuss findings which suggest that both "Utilitarian pacifism" and "Selective Pacifism are also relevant in the Irish context.

Irish Assistance to Ukraine

On the 20th of March 2023, Taoiseach Leo Varadkar pledged continued support and solidarity for Ukraine in a phone call with the Ukrainian president. (Murray, 2023).

Ryan (2023) noted that "Ireland has contributed €77 million to the European Peace facility" and has committed to training the Ukrainian armed forces under the EUMAM. Ryan noted that despite Irish insistence that our contribution goes exclusively to the provision of non-lethal equipment, there is an argument that says we are "displacing funding so that other member states can now devote their entire contribution to lethal equipment" (Ryan, 2023).

But despite what Ryan (2023) called the "incredulity" of international colleagues that Ireland claims these actions to be "militarily neutral", Ryan asserts that they are justifiable. "To simply call for peace, and step back from taking sides is amoral if not immoral" (Ryan, 2023). Andrews shares that view asking, "would people be happy for Ireland to be seen as equally favourable to both Russia and Ukraine" (Andrews, 2023).

These observations speak directly to JWT which states that it is an act of injustice to passively support the unjust side (Lottaz, 2022). But if we consider the views of proponents, JWT struggles to explain their position as they reject the use of violence. For example, looking at the views of Daly (2023) on Ukraine and Irish assistance, she states,

We stayed neutral when Germany, invaded Poland, the whole idea of being an independent neutral state is they shouldn't get involved in wars and now we are

training Ukrainian troops in Poland but that's not the role of a neutral state. (Daly, 2023)

Invoking what Realism calls the “security dilemma” Daly asserts that “militarism begets militarism” believing that one of the reasons for the conflict lies in Ukraine “cosying up to NATO and embarking in that military direction, so it was safer when it was neutral” (Daly, 2023).

Daly argues that we should help Ukraine, “by trying to bring an end diplomatically as the sanctions and the arming of Ukraine clearly haven't worked” (Daly, 2023). Ryan (2023) makes a key point however when he highlights that Russia has occupied 20% of Ukraine. He suggests that to call for a ceasefire “do you by definition, except the redefined border, which apportions 20% of the territory of Ukraine to Russia” (Ryan, 2023), a position which Berry (2023) labels “appeasement”.

For another and compounding perspective of JWT, Skelly writes,

Neutrality may be appropriate when a conflict occurs between states more or less according to the international laws of war. But it is inappropriate when all rules are openly violated and even the most fundamental norms of human decency are transgressed. (Skelly, 2001, p.118)

For the reason outlined by Skelly (2001) and when contrasted to the views of Daly, arguably those views fit the definition of a Utilitarian pacifist, who “deems violence to be an ineffective means to attain desirable goals and emphasise the possibilities of non-violent means to counter tyranny and exploitation” (Voorhoeve, 1982, p.15).

However, proponents add an extra layer to their argument through an anti-imperialist ideology that seems to characterise their view of neutrality. Barret contends,

Because Putin is the instigator of this terrible war, therefore, we should align ourselves with another big military bloc, a political-military block, mainly, NATO or a project of EU military militarization, or some of the bigger Western powers, who to my mind, may not be directly responsible for what's happening in Ukraine, but have an equal equally pretty horrid history of imperialism. (Barret, 2023)

Daly concludes,

We just find it interesting that nobody in the international community ever suggested sending arms to the Afghans or the Iraqis or the Palestinians or the Yemenis, it's not something that's done because we know that sending arms into a conflict zone just prolongs the conflict. (Daly, 2023)

The statements by participants suggest that proponent views on Ukraine fit the definition of selective pacifism, “where the attitude towards violence depends on the ideological situation” (Voorhoeve, 1982, p.15).

The author contends therefore that the concept of pacifism provides a better understanding of the proponent concept of “Irish Neutrality” than neutrality concepts from the literature.

Summary of Findings

This section provided findings from primary research collected through semi structured elite interviews with politicians, senior civil servants, academics, and interest groups. The key findings are as follows.

In ascribing a definition, the findings would suggest that Irish Neutrality is better described as military nonalignment. Proponents however would disagree with this definition as for them neutrality is part of their national identity, and as such, is about more than non-military participation.

The neutral idea for proponents is tied intimately to peace with “permanent unarmed neutrality” best describing proponents’ model of neutrality. However, the proponent concept of neutrality is paradoxical with an anti-imperialist sentiment of “not siding with the oppressor” contrasting with “not taking sides”. IR Theories struggle to reconcile the dichotomies of the proponent position, a position which pacifism appears more adept at explaining.

For Opponents, their position is largely realist in the face of the predictions of Realism being realised through war in Europe, but not amoral which speaks to Just War Theory. “Occasional” neutrality best describes opponents’ model of neutrality being closely aligned with 19th century concepts of neutrality e.g., the rights and duties of neutrals.

Opponents assert that Irish Neutrality is better described as non-alignment, which is labelled neutral, but irrespective of the governments “flexible neutrality” (Leahy, 2023) position, they assert the requirement for self-sufficiency in defence, echoing Keatinge (1984) and Salmon (1989) in neutrality requiring “an independent defence” and are aligned in the need for reform of the Triple Lock. A view rejected by proponents seeing the Triple Lock as vital to their model of neutrality, despite a paradoxical position on sovereignty issues, which also suggests a pacifist rather than a neutral view.

Conclusion

This paper sought to assess if Ireland’s model of neutrality can remain aligned with its foreign policy ambitions. The literature review identified key themes and further questions which the findings developed on. This chapter provides a summary of the findings and their implications and will provide recommendations.

Summary of Findings and Implications

Ireland’s policy of military non-alignment, labelled “neutrality”, could remain aligned to its global ambitions but proponent and opponent views present challenges to that status quo which require reflection.

Ireland is not a passive observer of international relations, rather it wants to influence international relations through its values based foreign policy, an element of which is labelled “military neutrality”. Ireland’s policy of military neutrality does not however align with accepted neutrality concepts in the literature, neither does it align with opponents, or proponents view of neutrality. Irish Neutrality is better described as military non-alignment

in that Ireland does not subscribe to any military alliance. Importantly, a policy of permanent neutrality, armed or unarmed, could not align with Ireland's foreign policy objectives, being incompatible with the UN Charter according to Dorr (2023).

The proponent concept of neutrality is paradoxical, the obvious inconsistency to be noted is in "not taking sides" on one hand and "not siding with the oppressor" on the other. While amoral Realism explains "not taking sides" it cannot explain the moral position of "not siding with the oppressor," thus, a confusing mix of "moral neutrality" and "ideological neutrality" noted by Fischer et al (2016, p.8) as missing amongst EU neutrals during the Cold War, rooted in a strong anti-imperialist sentiment which JWT and Liberalism struggle to explain owing to proponent's pacifist stance.

Proponents' ideological neutrality is also inconsistent, evidenced in their views on Ukraine, Ukraine not seeming to fulfil the criteria of being oppressed by Russia. This suggests the proponent focus on "not taking sides" is contingent on the sides in a conflict, thus not impartial. Further, that proponent's anti-imperialist ideology also appears to be selective.

Neutrality has become part of Irish national identity, but it has also become axiomatic, leading to its invocation in any conversation on national security and defence where proponents see neutrality as the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, dialogue, and diplomacy, a view which aligns with how Ireland currently carries out its values based foreign policy and a model of permanent neutrality that is intimately linked to peace in the absence of conflict in Ireland.

The findings suggest, as Salmon cautioned, that neutrality for proponents has become the ends rather than the means, with proponents' extreme view of neutrality, renouncing the enhancement of the Irish Defence Forces for example, suggesting Irish Neutrality among this group of proponents has become conflated with pacifism which could not align with Ireland values based foreign policy or global ambition.

The opponent position on neutrality reflects "occasional neutrality". It is Realist but not amoral, particularly on Ukraine which speaks to JWT. Elements of Irish Neutrality in action are not considered neutral behaviour by opponents or our international partners because Irish neutral behaviour is not impartial, hence not neutral. A key argument of opponents is to engage in these behaviours if that is government policy, but what is better described as non-alignment cannot continue to be labelled "neutral".

Opponents also assert the requirement for self-sufficiency and the obligation to protect Irish airspace, territorial waters, landmass, and cyberspace which applies whether one chooses neutrality, more pragmatic non-alignment or an alliance. It would appear in the face of the predictions of Realism being realised, that pacifism would better explain continued "Irish liberal neutrality" (Jesse, 2006) if realities are ignored.

Whereas government and opponent positions on the Triple Lock are aligned in the need for reform, proponents are emphatically against any change. Again, there is a clear paradox in the proponent position. The Triple Lock, by design, transfers sovereign decision making on the deployment of Ireland's armed forces to the permanent five members of the UNSC, a decision which should be the sole preserve of the state to exercise control over its armed forces. How can a "neutral" country allow other countries to decide how it utilises its

armed forces? Paradoxically, for proponents, this does not conflict with either their anti-imperialist ideology or their model of neutrality, instead they point to a need for UN reform rather than reform of the Triple Lock.

The findings suggest this is due to proponents viewing the Triple Lock as the one mechanism that constrains the Government's deployment of the DF overseas and as such is vital to their model of neutrality, which better aligns with pacifism, emphasising again that for proponents, their model of neutrality has become the ends rather than the means.

Recommendations

Near the completion of this research, the Government announced it would be holding a "Consultative Forum" on international security policy (DFA, 2023). The author offers recommendations resulting from this research which may align with possible objectives of the Consultative Forum.

Firstly, while originally suggested that a citizen's assembly would be held, the research indicates that neutrality is a nebulous concept which has been conflated with pacifism on the proponent side. This speaks to a need for a pedagogical approach by the forum, which is non-binary on neutrality. That said, O'Neill (2022) wrote regarding the CODF finding that the DF are not fit for purpose, that "we need to ask, at the most basic level, what purpose we want the policy [of neutrality] to serve".

As such, the threat environment needs to be discussed and policy options assessed in deciding how best Ireland can protect its interests. The author would contend that a successful consultative forum would highlight the requirement for the completion of a national security strategy to direct how Ireland will protect her interests which could be followed by a citizen's assembly once different options, which may or may not include neutrality, are assessed and explained.

On the Triple Lock, Irish participation with the UN and the EU is noted as being central to Irish foreign policy and illustrating Ireland's ambition for global engagement. There have been no new peacekeeping missions since 2014 and Ireland is withdrawing from UNDOF¹⁰. To maintain a mechanism such as the Triple Lock, which could restrict our foreign policy choices and ambition in an environment where peacekeeping opportunities are likely to be increasingly limited would be a poor demonstration of small state sovereignty. In line with the fact that there have been no new UN missions since 2014, further research on the implications of the decline in peacekeeping for the DF is an area requiring further research.

Concluding Thoughts

Whether the government maintains its policy of military neutrality, or moves towards military non-alignment, there remains a requirement for the state to provide for its primary responsibility, the protection of its interests and safeguarding of its citizens at home and abroad. Events in Sudan in April 2023 highlighted again the "defence deficit" and self-imposed

¹⁰ Ireland contributes troops to the United Nations disengagement observer force whose mandate is to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria.

limitations of the Triple Lock in extracting Irish citizens as did events in Afghanistan in August 2021.

The DF has benefited from a foreign policy that emphasises the centrality of peacekeeping to that policy. Consequently however, and unusually for an island nation, the defence focus has been on overseas peacekeeping, forgoing other services a military could provide, particularly in the air and maritime domains, such as transport, which would and could align with Ireland's extensive humanitarian efforts.

The international geopolitical environment sees peacekeeping declining and the lack of consensus in the UN deepening. This suggests that Ireland needs to look at avenues other than UN mandated peacekeeping and CSDP missions to illustrate the centrality of the DF to its global engagement.

To conclude, in the changing European security landscape, whether a deliberate policy choice as TK Whittaker asserted or not, the lack of self-sufficiency in Ireland's current model of neutrality, increasingly appears a dangerous "gamble on peace".

Please note that this views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and should not be taken to represent the views of the Irish Defence Forces, the Command and Staff School or any other group or organisation.

REFERENCES

Abbenhuis, M. (2014). *An age of neutrals: great power politics, 1815-1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, 3, 319-363.

Armstrong, H.F. (1956). *Neutrality: Varying Tunes*. [online] Foreign Affairs. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1956-10-01/neutrality-varying-tunes> (Accessed 3 Jan. 2023).

Austin, D. A. (1998). Realism, institutions, and neutrality: constraining conflict through the force of norms. *Commonwealth: A Journal of Political Science*, 9, 37-56.

Baciu, C. (2020). Assessing the Strategic Implications of the 'Triple-Lock' for Ireland's Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Engagement in International Peace Missions in a Context of Geopolitical Competition. *Defence Forces Review*, 2020, 114-121.

Barret, C. (2020). The rise of the EU as a security and Defence Power, and the positive implications for Ireland. *Defence Forces Review*, 2020, 160 – 166.

Barret, R.B. (2022). Thirty-ninth amendment of the constitution (Neutrality) Bill 2022. *Dail Debates 1020-3, 30 March 2022*. [online] Available at: <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2022-03-30/10/> (Accessed 2 Jan. 2023).

Barry, M. (2022). Thirty-ninth amendment of the constitution (Neutrality) Bill 2022. *Dail Debates* 1020-46, 30 March 2022. [online] Available at: <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2022-03-30/10/> (Accessed 2 Jan. 2023).

Bergmann, M. & Haddad, B. (2021). *Europe Needs to Step Up on Defense*. [online] Foreign Affairs. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/europe/europe-needs-step-defense> (Accessed 18 May 2023).

Berry, C. (2022). Vote 36 – Defence (Revised). *Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence Debate*, 09 March 2022. [online] Available at: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/select_committee_on_foreign_affairs_and_defence/2022-03-09/4/ (Accessed 2 Jan. 2023).

Brady, J. (2022a). Vote 36 – Defence (Revised). *Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence Debate*, 09 March 2022. [online] Available at: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/select_committee_on_foreign_affairs_and_defence/2022-03-09/4/ (Accessed 2 Jan. 2023).

Brady, J. (2022b). *Future of the Defence Forces needs to be defined by our neutrality*. [online] www.sinnfein.ie. Available at: <https://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/63096> (Accessed 5 Jan. 2023).

Brady, J. (2022c). *John Brady TD Criticises Fine Gael Moves to Abandon Triple Lock System for Deployment of Irish Troops Abroad*. [online] www.sinnfein.ie. Available at: <https://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/64667> (Accessed 10 Apr. 2023).

Briffa, H. (2022). Neutrality and Small States: A Strategic Approach In: Lottaz, P. Gärtner, H. & Reginbogin, H.R. (2022). *Neutral Beyond the Cold*. Rowman & Littlefield. 19-38.

Brown, C. & Ainley, K. (2005). *Understanding international relations*, New York; Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan.

Bruno, K. (2022). *Russia's war revives 'neutrality' debate*. [online] [SWI swissinfo.ch](http://swissinfo.ch). Available at: https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/russia-s-war-sparks-new-debate-about-neutrality/47417204?utm_campaign=teaser-in (Accessed 6 Jan. 2023).

Burke, C. (2004). What are the costs and benefits of Ireland's policy of neutrality? Unpublished MA Thesis. Maynooth University.

Commission on the Defence Forces. (2022). *Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces*. Dublin: Department of Defence [online]. Available at: <https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/eb4c0-report-of-the-commission-on-defence-forces/d> (Accessed 02 Jan. 2023).

Coghlan, D. & Brydon-Miller, M. (2014). *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Cottey, A. (2017). *The European neutrals and NATO: non-alignment, partnership, membership?* London, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cottey, A. (2022). A Celtic Zeitenwende? – Continuity and Change in Irish National Security Policy. *Defence Forces Review*, 2022, 2-9.

Coveney, S. (2022). Irelands Military Neutrality: Motion. *Seanad Éireann debate 290-125, November 2022*. [online] Available at: <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/seanad/2022-11-23/14/> (Accessed 02 Jan. 2023).

Creswell, J.W. & Poth, C.N. (2018). *Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five approaches*, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage.

Cruz, M. Ritzel, S. Halfhill, D.S. & Brabazon, J.J. (2020). Between Theory and Practice: The Utility of International Relations Theory to the Military Practitioner, *Air University, Wild Blue Yonder*. [online] Available at: <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/WildBlueYonder/Article-Display/Article/2063140/> (Accessed 4 Jan. 2023).

Danish Parliament. (2022). *The Danish opt-outs from EU cooperation*. [online] EU Information Centre. Available at: <https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/eu-information-centre/the-danish-opt-outs-from-eu-cooperation> (Accessed 1 Jan. 2023).

De Coning, C. (2021). The future of UN peace operations: Principled adaptation through phases of contraction, moderation, and renewal. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 42(2), pp. 211–224. doi:10.1080/13523260.2021.1894021.

Department of Defence. (2015). *White Paper on Defence*, Dublin: Department of Defence [online], Available at: <https://assets.gov.ie/21963/f1e7723dd1764a4281692f3f7cb96966.pdf>

Department Of Defence. (2019). *White Paper on Defence: Update 2019*, Dublin: Department of Defence [online], Available at: <https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/a519cf-white-paper-on-defence-update-2019/>

Department of Foreign Affairs. (2023). *Tánaiste announces plans for a Consultative Forum on International Security Policy - Department of Foreign Affairs*. [online] www.dfa.ie. Available at: <https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-archive/2023/march/tanaiste-announces-plans-for-a-consultative-forum-on-international-security-policy.php> (Accessed 9 Apr. 2023).

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2015). *The Global Island: Irelands foreign policy for a changing world*. Dublin: Department of Foreign Affairs [online], Available at: <https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/ourwork/global-island/the-global-island-irelands-foreign-policy.pdf>

Department of Foreign Affairs. (2022). *Neutrality - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*. [online] www.dfa.ie. Available at: <https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/international-priorities/peace-and-security/neutrality/> (Accessed 1 Jan. 2023).

Department of the Taoiseach. (2002). *National Declaration by Ireland*. Seville. Dublin: Department of the Taoiseach [online], Available at:

https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/6/17/a442cb15-0528-45609d120b46fb5c75d4/publishable_en.pdf

Devine, K. (2006). *Public Opinion and Irish Neutrality; A theoretical and empirical test of the "rational public" hypothesis*. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Dublin, Trinity College.

Drea, E. (2022). *Ireland Is Europe's Weakest Link*. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/08/ireland-military-neutrality-russia-ocean-communication-energy-infrastructure-sabotage/>. (Accessed 23 Dec. 2023).

Edwards, R. & Holland, J. (2013). *What is qualitative interviewing?*, Bloomsbury Academic.

Fischer, T. Aunesluoma, J. & Makko, A. (2016). Introduction: Neutrality and Nonalignment in World Politics during the Cold War. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 18, 4-11.

Fitzgerald, G. (1982). The Falklands Crisis: Statement by Taoiseach. *Dail Debates* 334-4, 11 May 1982. [online] Available at: <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1982-05-11/10/> (Accessed 10 April. 2023).

Fitzgerald, G. (1998). "The Origins, Development and Present Status of Irish 'Neutrality'", *Irish studies in international affairs*, vol. 9, pp. 11-19.

Fitzgerald, M. (2000). *Irish Neutrality and European integration, 1960-1972*, Loughborough University.

Flynn, B. (2018). PESCO and the Challenges of Multilateral Defence Cooperation for Ireland: More of the Same or Sea Change? *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 29, 73-95. DOI: 10.3318.

Fryer, T. (2020). *A short guide to ontology and epistemology: Why everyone should be a critical realist*. Available at: <https://tfryer.com/ontology-guide/> (Accessed 19 Feb. 2023).

Given, L. (2008). *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*. Thousand Oaks, Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Goetschel, L. (2022). Neutrality and Geopolitics: Responding to change in: Lottaz, P. Gärtner, H. & Reginbodin, H.R. (2022). *Neutral Beyond the Cold*. Rowman & Littlefield. 3-19.

Graham, M. W. (1927). The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant on the Theory and Practice of Neutrality. *California Law Review*, 15, 357-377.

Haughey, C. (1982). The Falklands Crisis: Statement by Taoiseach. *Dail Debates* 334-4, 11 May 1982. [online] Available at: <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1982-05-11/10/> (Accessed 10 April. 2023).

Jesse, N. G. (2006). Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective. *International political science review*, 27, 7-28.

Jesse, N. G. (2007). Contemporary Irish Neutrality: Still a Singular Stance. *New hibernia review*, 11, 74-95.

Joenniemi, P. (1993). Neutrality beyond the Cold War. *Review of International Studies*, 19, 289-304.

Keatinge, P. (1984). *A singular stance: Irish neutrality in the 1980's*, Dublin, Ireland, Institute of Public Administration.

Keatinge, P. (2019). The “specific character” of Ireland's security and defence policy: Reflections on Neutrality. *Institute of International and European Affairs* (IIEA). Available at: <https://www.iiea.com/publications/the-specific-character-of-ireland's-security-and-defence-policy-reflections-on-neutrality>

Kelly, S. (2022). "When C.J. Haughey ‘Drove Maggie Mad’ —Ireland and the Falklands War", *History Ireland*, [online], vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 44-47.

Kitano, M. (2020). Ireland's Neutrality Policy and Japan's Alliance Policy. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 31, 189-208. DOI:10.3318

Laculiceanu, O. G. (2006). Denmark's security policy during the interwar period. *Annales d'Université "Valahia" Târgoviște. Section d'Archéologie et d'Histoire*, 8, 285-291.

Leahy, P. (2023). *RAF revelations focus uncomfortable attention on Ireland's flexible neutrality*. [online] The Irish Times. Available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2023/05/12/raf-revelations-focus-uncomfortable-attention-on-ireland's-flexible-neutrality/> (Accessed 19 May 2023).

Leahy, P. and Gallagher, C. (2022). *Irish neutrality means whatever the government of the day wants it to mean*. [online] The Irish Times. Available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/irish-neutrality-means-whatever-the-government-of-the-day-wants-it-to-mean-1.4818543> (Accessed 7 Mar. 2023).

Leahy, P. and Gallagher, C. (2023). *Public discussions on future of Irish neutrality to be held later this year*. [online] The Irish Times. Available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2023/03/24/government-plans-discussion-on-future-of-neutrality/> (Accessed 10 Apr. 2023).

Leahy, P. and McLaughlin, D. (2022). *Overwhelming support for retention of Ireland's military neutrality*. [online] The Irish Times. Available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/overwhelming-support-for-retention-of-ireland-s-military-neutrality-1.4853176>. (Accessed 7 Mar. 2023).

Lee, D. (2021). *‘A gamble on peace’ – Dorchá Lee on TK Whitaker and defence spending*. [online] The Irish Times. Available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/a-gamble-on-peace-dorchá-lee-on-tk-whitaker-and-defence-spending-1.4766114> (Accessed 28 Apr. 2023).

Lottaz, P. (2020). The Logic of Neutrality In: Reginbogin, H.R. and Pascal Lottaz (2020). *Permanent Neutrality*. Lexington Books. 57- 86.

Lottaz, P. (2022). Neutrality Studies. *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of International Studies*.

Martin, M. (2022). Interview on *RTE News* [television]. Dublin: RTE. 16 March 2022. Retrieved from: <https://www.rte.ie/news/2022/0316/1286717-tracker-ukraine-day-21/>. (Accessed 02 Aug. 2022).

McNamara, E.M. (2022a). *Evolving Irish Neutrality: Military Opportunities and Political Obstacles*. [online] www.rusi.org<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/evolving-irish-neutrality-military-opportunities-and-political-obstacles> (Accessed 1 Jan. 2023).

McNamara, E.M. (2022b). *Ireland's Defence Deficit*. [online] www.rusi.org<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/irelands-defence-deficit> (Accessed 1 Jan. 2023).

McNamara, E.M. (2023). Ireland, NATO and “the Return of Geopolitics” in Europe In: Carroll, J., O'Neill, M.G. and Williams, M. (2023). *The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security*. Springer Nature.

McQuinn, C. (2023). *Ireland's policy on neutrality and defence to be reviewed by public forum*. [online] *The Irish Times*. Available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2023/04/05/irelands-policy-on-neutrality-and-defence-to-be-reviewed-by-public-forum/> (Accessed 14 Apr. 2023).

Merriam, S.B. & Grenier, R.S. (2019). *Qualitative research in practice: examples for discussion and analysis*, San Francisco, California, Jossey-Bass.

Merriam, S.B. & Tisdell, E.J. (2015). *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation*, Newark, UNITED STATES, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated.

Mills, J. & Birks, M. (2014). *Qualitative methodology: a practical guide*, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications.

Murphy, R. (2002). Ireland, Peacekeeping and Defence Policy in: Tonra, B. & Ward, E. (2002). *Ireland in international affairs: interests, institutions and identities - essays in honour of Professor N.P. Keatinge*. Dublin, Institute of Public Administration.

Murray, S. (2023). *Zelenskyy thanks Varadkar for Ireland's 'important support' during phone call*. [online] *Irish Examiner*. Available at: <https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/politics/arid-41097928.html> (Accessed 15 Apr. 2023).

O'Halloran, M. (2022). Minister for Foreign Affairs backs change to 'triple-lock' as 'sensible'. *The Irish Times*. [online] 19 Nov. Available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2022/11/19/minister-for-foreign-affairs-backs-change-to-triple-lock-as-sensible/> (Accessed 13 Dec. 2022).

O'Leary, N. (2022). *Ireland's crucial submarine cables are vulnerable to attack*. [online] *The Irish Times*. Available at: <https://www.irishtimes.com/world/europe/2022/09/28/irelands-submarine-cables-are-vulnerable-to-attack> (Accessed 8 Jan. 2023).

O'Neill, P. (2022). *The Irish Times view on Ireland's military neutrality: a new definition for a new era*. [online] *The Irish Times*. Available at:

<https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/editorial/the-irish-times-view-on-ireland-s-military-neutrality-a-new-definition-for-a-new-era-1.4847402> (Accessed 7 Jan. 2023).

PANA. (2022a). *In the face of vicious attacks on Irish Neutrality, PANA has published a new paper on the “Triple Lock” which preserves the central role of the UN in Irish foreign policy.* [Twitter] 07 October 2022. Available at: <https://twitter.com/PANAireland/status/1578189422150840320?cxt=HHwWgMCjd667eYrAAAA> (Accessed 1 Jan. 2023).

PANA. (2022b). *Neutrality NATO and the attack on Ireland’s Triple Lock.* Peace and Neutrality Alliance. [online] Available at: https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/61f7ee611d3fce1125869ac7/633d3c10a9d6ff59aef42513_PANA%20Triple%20Lock.pdf

People before Profit (2022a). *Defence – People Before Profit.* [online] People before Profit. Available at: <https://www.pbp.ie/policies/defence/> (Accessed 10 Apr. 2023).

People Before Profit. (2022b). *Defence Report: Attempt To Soften Public Opinion To Further Erode Irish Neutrality – People Before Profit.* [online] pbp.ie. Available at: <https://www.pbp.ie/defence-report-attempt-to-soften-public-opinion-to-further-erode-irish-neutrality/> (Accessed 8 Jan. 2023).

Renata Dwan. (2022). *Building Up Irish Defence: The commission on the Defence Forces.* Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA). [video online] Available at: <https://www.iiea.com/events/building-up-irish-defence-the-commission-on-the-defence-forces/d> (Accessed 22 Aug. 2022).

Richmond, N. (2022). Taoiseach’s meetings and engagements. *Dáil Debates 1023, Cols. 30513/22, 14 June 2022.* <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2022-06-14/11/>.

Rooney, C. and Cogan, C. (2022). *Neutrality or NATO? Irish attitudes to neutrality and possible NATO membership.* [online] Available at: www.behaviourwise.ie/irelands-views-on-neutrality-and-nato.

Salmon, T.C. (1989). *Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Sestanovich, S. (2022). The Less Said About NATO and Ukraine, the Better. *Foreign Affairs.* [online] 15 Sep. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-02-16/less-said-about-nato-and-ukraine-better> (Accessed 1 Jan. 2023).

Skelly, J. M. (1996). Ireland, the Department of External Affairs, and the United Nations, 1946-55: A New Look. *Irish studies in international affairs*, 7, 63-80.

Skelly, J.M. (2001). On the Obsolescence of Just War and Military Neutrality. *Peace Review*, 13(1), pp. 115–120. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/10402650120038233>.

Smith, E. (2015). The Traditional Routes to Security In: P, Hough. Et Al. (2015). *International Security Studies: Theory and Practice*. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, Ny: Routledge, An Imprint Of The Taylor & Francis Group.

Tonra, B. (2012). *Irish foreign policy*, Dublin, Gill & Macmillan.

Tonra, B. (2013a). *Global citizen and European republic: Irish foreign policy in transition: Irish foreign policy in transition*, Manchester University Press.

Tonra, B. (2013b). Unpicking the Triple Lock of Irelands Defence Green Paper. UCD School of Politics and International relations. [online] 17 July 2013. Available at: <http://politicalscience.ie/?p=451>

Voorhoeve, J.J.C. (1982). Pacifist-Neutrality in Western Europe. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, [online] 2(4). Available at: <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/14561> (Accessed 15 Apr. 2023).

