

The Irish Defence Forces Joint Professional Military Education Strategy 2025-2028

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This article introduces the Irish Defence Forces' Joint Professional Military Education Strategy 2025-2028. It provides an insight into the challenge of writing a military education strategy during a time of unprecedented organisational change, driven by the recommendations of the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces published in 2022. The article highlights the efforts made to achieve strategic alignment for JPME by 'nesting' the strategy in both defence policy and Government plans for the transformation of the Defence Forces. The article introduces key aspects of the strategy, including the framework and principles used to provide coherence to the overall approach.

Introduction

We are building a bridge to the future while standing on it.

(Singer, 2009, p. 19)

In the Keynote Address at the Professional Military Education (PME) Conference at Maynooth University in January 2025, Professor Kate Utting used the above quote from Singer's book *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century*. Professor Utting noted that the contextual framework for PME was changing due to the shifting strategic environment, the changing character of war, and the different expectations of a new generation of learners, all of which challenges PME to evolve continually. Something about the quote resonated with me. At the time of the conference, I was in the middle of writing the *Defence Forces Joint Professional Military Education Strategy 2025-2028* with a small interdisciplinary team drawn from across the Defence Forces. Singer's notion of building a bridge to the future while standing on it perfectly summed up how I felt about the task of creating a training and education strategy for an unknown future, for a different generation of learners, and for a military organisation whose structure is yet to be determined.

This article aims to introduce the key tenets of the Irish Defence Forces' JPME Strategy 2025-2028 and provide an insight into the rationale behind the approach taken, as well as the key decisions made and indeed avoided during the writing process. This paper begins with a brief analysis of the Defence Forces' organisational context, which has been influenced by the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces (CoDF) published in 2022. A summary of key aspects of the strategy follows, including the framework used to provide coherence to the overall approach.



This paper may be helpful to military educators and leaders who are developing their own organisational or institutional training and education strategies at a time of considerable organisational uncertainty.

Background and Organisational Context

The Defence Forces' first PME strategy was published in 2021. *Defence Forces Professional Military Education (PME) Strategy 2021-2024* aimed to develop a framework that defines the Defence Forces' education and career pathways, enabling a practical and progressive approach to delivering education and training needs (Defence Forces, 2021). The 2021 strategy effectively guided the delivery of PME for the past three years, contributing positively to the improvement of military capability.

Since the publication of the first strategy, significant changes have occurred at a geopolitical and organisational level. The White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2023 opens with a stark analysis of the security environment, noting that “Europe faces an acute and growing threat” and has “...other growing threats and security challenges, in its region and beyond” (European Commission, 2025, p. 2). With the return of inter-state war to Europe and conflict in the Middle East, Ireland's traditionally low threat level is less certain. Indeed, the Defence Policy Review published in 2024 notes that Ireland faces “similar threats and challenges as other states who support the rules-based international order” (Minister of Defence, 2024, p. 1).

Driving Change in PME - The Commission on the Defence Forces

The Commission on the Defence Forces published its report in 2022. In response to the volatile strategic environment, and the “domestic crisis in the Defence Forces” (Cotter, 2020, p. 9), the Commission recommends significant changes for the organisation and to the level of defence provision in Ireland. The transformation programme includes a comprehensive overhaul of the organisation's capabilities, culture, high-level command and control structures, and human resources and staffing. The Commission's vision for the Defence Forces of 2030 and beyond is:

The Defence Forces will be a joint military force capable of providing the people of Ireland with a safe and secure environment, and enforcing and protecting Ireland's sovereignty. It will uphold national values, reflect the diverse society that it serves and remain poised to meet the challenges of an evolving and complex world. (CoDF, 2022, p. iii)

The scale of the transformation recommended by the Commission is unprecedented. The Commission identified that “relatively high levels of ambition for Ireland's military capabilities, as set out in the White Paper [2015], are not supported by the resources provided for the Defence Forces” (ibid., p. iv). They concluded that this represents a policy-strategy mismatch, where the strategic ambitions did not align with the allocation of resources. Essentially, the Defence Forces were given an impossible task in implementing the White Paper (2015) without being provided with the resources to achieve defence policy objectives. To prevent this from recurring and to provide a more coherent link between policy and strategy, the Commission developed a three-tier framework, known as Levels of Ambition (LOA), to match military capability with resourcing requirements. The three tiers of LOA are:

LOA 1 current capability aims “to uphold sovereign rights and serving on peace support operations to the same extent as at present” (ibid., p. iv).

LOA 2 enhanced capability aims to build “on current capability to address specific priority gaps in our ability to deal with an assault on Irish sovereignty and to serve in higher intensity Peace Support Operations” (ibid., p. v).

LOA 3 conventional capability aims to develop “full spectrum defence capabilities to protect Ireland and its people to an extent comparable to similar sized countries in Europe” (ibid., p. v).

In July 2022, the Government approved a decision to move to LOA 2 *Enhanced Capability* by 2028. The Detailed Implementation Plan (DIP) published in November 2023 notes that the move to LOA 2 will require an additional 2,000 personnel (civil and military) above the 2022 establishment of 9,500 to reach a new Permanent Defence Forces establishment of 11,500. It will also include a move to 4,500 Reserve Defence Forces personnel. To quantify the scale of the task, the Defence Forces’ current strength is 7,557 (Minister of Defence, 2025), almost 4,000 short of the 11,500 target by 2028. LOA 2 is associated with an increasing defence budget to €1.5 billion by 2028. Ireland’s defence budget in 2024 (€1.29 billion) equates to 0.24 per cent of its GDP, the lowest in the EU (Clapp, 2025).

In the Programme for Government 2025 the Government have subsequently committed to “providing the funding and political support necessary to achieve Level of Ambition 2 Enhanced Capability and move as quickly as possible to Level of Ambition 3 with commensurate investment as appropriate” (Department of the Taoiseach, 2025, p. 144). The move to LOA 3 will require a significant investment and an expansion of capabilities and strengths across all domains.

What does this mean for JPME?

The state’s security challenges and ambitions for defence, coupled with a considerable organisational-level transformation process, place significant responsibilities on the training and education function now and in the future. JPME Strategy 2025-2028 was therefore developed with the understanding that it is a living document, allowing and expecting agility in the Defence Forces’ response to internal and external changes. It is nested within the five associated Strategic Objectives as specified in the *Strategic Framework*, which are: Strategic HR and Cultural Change to be Delivered; Services to be Reformed and Restructured; New Command and Control and Joint Structures to be Established; Joint Capability Development; and Reserve Defence Force to be Revitalised (Minister of Defence, 2023).

Developing a JPME strategy for 2025-2028 is a key enabler for achieving the strategic objectives outlined in the CoDF Report, supporting 16 DIP themes and work packages, as illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Strategic Objectives and DIP Themes

Framing the Challenge

Informed by the organisational context, Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), Major General Tony McKenna, convened a Working Group in September 2024 to create a new PME strategy. The Board, led by the Director of Defence Forces Training and Education Branch, were directed to conduct its work under the following terms of reference:

1. Develop a Joint Professional Military Education Strategy and associated PME action plan to support the Government's decision to achieve LOA 2 by 2028.
2. Examine the Defence Forces PME Strategy 2021-2024 and assess the relevance of existing content, strategic priorities, and implementation plan in the context of the CoDF recommendations.
3. Provide clear PME pathways for technical, enlisted, and officer streams across all services and the RDF. Pathways should be progressive, accessible and accredited externally (where appropriate), with learning outcomes commensurate with professional roles and responsibilities as military leaders and managers.
4. Consider the role of the military instructor and propose a professional military instructor development pathway to ensure high quality training and education delivery.
5. Engage with Directorates/Corps, Formations, and Services to identify and mitigate any impacts that proposed changes may have on the Defence Forces' operational outputs (domestic and overseas).
6. Maximise blended and online learning opportunities appropriately, delivering the best possible learning outcomes for 21st century military learners.
7. Incorporate an equality, diversity and inclusion perspective into the strategy to promote fair treatment and equal opportunities for all members of the Defence Forces.
8. Build flexibility and agility into the strategy as it is being developed during a period of unprecedented organisational change.

9. Make any other recommendations regarding the provision of PME that the Board deem appropriate.

Considering the scale of the task given to the Working Group, it is easy to see why Professor Utting's use of Singer's quote struck a chord. In a slight departure from the quote, the process at times felt like we were "Building a bridge to the future while standing on it...while the architectural plans for the bridge are still being drafted!". Nevertheless, the Working Group set about its task diligently, addressing each of the terms of reference as thoroughly as possible. After several meetings and much debate, the Working Group's deliberations coalesced around a framework that would undergird the strategy, provide structure, unity and agility, guiding the research and writing process.

In the next section, some key aspects of the strategy are reproduced to provide a summary of the overall framework used to develop and structure the strategy.

Introducing The Defence Forces JPME Strategy 2025-2028

The JPME Strategy 2025-2028 provides a comprehensive approach for enhancing the Defence Forces' training and education over the next four years, aiming to provide strategic alignment to the training and education system. Strategic alignment ensures that all aspects of an organisation are working together to achieve its defined objectives (The Strategy Story, 2025). The Working Group needed to ensure that the JPME Strategy was aligned with Defence policy and high-level plans for organisational transformation. The strategy formalises government policy intentions for Defence Force training and education as articulated in the White Paper 2015, its update in 2019, and the Defence Policy Review (DPR) published in 2024. It also encompasses the Government CoDF High-Level Action Plan (HLAP) and Detailed Implementation Plan (DIP). The Commission made several recommendations regarding the Reserve Defence Forces (RDF). The RDF Regeneration and Development Plan encompasses several interconnected training and education initiatives that will be implemented throughout the strategy's lifetime.

Defining Joint Professional Military Education

Although the phrase 'PME' is widely used in military and academic contexts, it is a term that is highly contested, with each nation having its own definition of PME reflecting its approach to military training and education. Some nations consider PME as an institution, exclusively for the education of officers, with Libel (2021, p. 122) defining it as "an institution which sets the social rules, norms and ideas for the organisations tasked with the education of officers". Others, such as Shanks Kaurin (2017), believe PME relates to "a plethora of training, continuing education, and other activities designed to provide development to members of the military at various points in their career and to prepare them for the next level of responsibilities". However, neither definition accurately reflects the Defence Forces' approach to PME. As the Defence Forces had not previously defined PME or JPME, the Working Group considered it essential to define it in the Irish context. The approach taken was to examine the key components of the definition, namely joint, professional, and military education, to provide the foundation for the definition.

Jointness

The title of this PME strategy includes jointness, reflecting the Defence Forces' approach to developing joint capabilities to meet future challenges (Defence Forces, 2016). Jointness describes the “activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate” (NATO, 2011). The combination of land, sea, air, cyber, and space activities, capabilities, operations, and organisations enhances and increases the capabilities of individual service components beyond their organic contributions.

The White Paper 2015 states that the Defence Forces “must be able to operate jointly – that is to bring elements of the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service together to deliver effects in operations in a coordinated and cohesive manner” (Government of Ireland, 2015, para 6.2.1). It further recognises that:

[T]his is increasingly necessary for a broad range of operations at home and to be able to operate seamlessly with partners overseas. Jointness requires the capacity to develop and feed into a joint common operational picture (COP) with appropriate command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capacity. (Ibid.)

Defence Policy Review (2024) also indicates the future Defence Forces capability development requirement to “... focus on the conduct of joint multi-domain operations and defence delivery across the various operational domains” (p. 27). Defence Forces Military Doctrine acknowledges that “Few contemporary operations are conducted by a single component. Successful joint campaigns and operations require a comprehensive approach to maximise the overall effectiveness of the joint force...” (Defence Forces, 2024b, p. 61).

Reversing Historical Disjointedness

Speller (2023, p. 8) notes that “Historically Irish approaches to defence have been remarkably un-joint”. The dominance of the army and in particular, the “infantry ethos”, is cited by Speller as a historical reason for the Defence Forces' lack of jointery. Similarly, Hegarty (2019) believes that a “land-centric command and control legacy” has inhibited jointness. However, analysis that blames the army or indeed the Infantry Corps for the lack of jointness ignores the fact that there was no stated defence policy to guide the Defence Forces' approach to operations until 2000, when the first White Paper on Defence was published. O'Halpin (2016) suggests that historical interactions originating from the ‘army mutiny’ in March 1924 led to the absence of engagement with Irish defence policy, because it was just too contentious to address. This resulted in a situation where no formal defence policy was articulated until the first White Paper on Defence was published in 2000, 79 years after Ireland gained independence from the United Kingdom. Considering that there was no overarching policy guiding key defence capability decisions, it is no wonder that the Defence Forces have limited experience in operating jointly, with individual services focusing on their own priorities and in competition with each other for scarce resources. A lack of policy, rather than Infantry dominance, has contributed to today's disjointedness. The White Paper (2015), the Commission, the Defence Policy Review, and doctrinal updates have made significant strides in addressing this issue, providing a more coherent link between policy objectives, strategy and delivery.

JPME Strategy 2025-2028 recognises that each service domain will always have unique service-driven training and education priorities. Indeed, own domain mastery is emphasised within the strategy. However, to achieve the defence policy goal of jointness, the Defence Forces must also conduct joint training and education to ensure that personnel can operate effectively in a joint capacity, and, within other domains (Hegarty, 2019). The cognitive preparation for jointness starts with JPME, long before the equipment arrives. The current approach for embedding jointness into PME involves educating senior officers on the Joint Command and Staff course, which focuses on joint concepts and planning joint operations. Arguably, this comes too late for senior officers and does not address the training and education needs of the rest of the organisation. As the Defence Forces transition towards a Joint Forces Command structure, educating for jointness should occur prior to and in parallel with equipment acquisition, doctrinal development, and changes in force design.

The strategy recognises that the Defence Forces must enhance and build on the progress made in joint training and education to ensure that land, sea, air and, in the near future, cyber and space forces can integrate smoothly into operations. It will be achieved by introducing joint concepts into junior leader career courses and building on that knowledge as they progress through their military education. This will ensure that Defence Forces personnel have the foundational understanding expected of their rank to operate within a truly joint force. Knowledge and comprehension must be achieved before more advanced cognitive functions such as analysis, synthesis, and creative problem-solving can be employed (Willingham, 2010). In other words, we must embed the foundational knowledge of jointness throughout the organisation before we can think critically about it and employ it creatively to solve operational problems.

Professional – The Profession of Arms

Service in the Defence Forces means being a member of the military profession. Professions are characterised by several distinct features that define them as professions (Millett, 1977). A key characteristic of any profession is its body of theoretical and technical knowledge. In the military, this body of knowledge is known as military doctrine and is learned by members of the military profession through extensive, career-long specialised training and education. Arising from their monopoly on a specialised body of knowledge, military professionals have a professional responsibility to use that knowledge in the service of society, which is a feature of professions. Professions also have the autonomy to establish and practise standards to assure quality. This is achieved through a structured approach to learning and developing new knowledge from experience and practice, utilising lessons learned processes to inform new doctrine. Being a member of a profession requires a career-long commitment to learning and mastering the body of professional knowledge associated with that profession. Doing so assists in fulfilling the function of the profession of arms:

[W]hich is the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social or political problem...The essential task of its members is to fight, individually and collectively; of its officers, to direct and lead those who apply the instruments of destruction to achieve assigned ends. (Hackett, 1983, p. 9)

Samuel Huntington (1957) noted that professions have a:

Sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, the common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility.

Service in the Defence Forces means being part of the Irish military profession, bonded by Huntington's "sense of organic unity" with "unique social responsibility". At each stage of service in the Defence Forces, the primary goal is to master the knowledge, military and technical skills and competencies associated with a specific rank and role. This strategy recognises the importance of Defence Forces personnel developing expertise in the military skills, knowledge, and professional competencies of their chosen domain so that specialised military knowledge can be responsibly employed in the service of the Irish people.

Military Training and Education

As a professional organisation, the Defence Forces must have an effective military education system at its core. The terms *training*, *education* and *learning* are used interchangeably in the Defence Forces. The Defence Forces acknowledge that military professionals need a combination of training, education, informal, and experiential learning to operate effectively in the contemporary operating environment.

The adage that we "train for certainty but educate for uncertainty" (Shoomaker, 2004) remains as relevant today as ever. To put it another way, military training focuses on teaching "how", while military education focuses on teaching "why" (Trelfey, 1992). Grygiel (2013) summarises this as "training gives one skills; education leads one toward a purpose". In other words, education leads to an understanding of the reason *why* by providing the *in order to*, or the purpose of a mission.

The Defence Forces acknowledges that military personnel at every level require the skills to perform their roles and formal military education to solve problems in an ethical manner. This places significant demands on the military education system and requires military education to operate across all three domains of *Bloom's Taxonomy of Learning* (Bloom & Krathwohl, 1956); the *psychomotor*, *affective* and *cognitive* domains.




Figure. 2. Adapted from Bloom's Taxonomy of Learning

The *psychomotor* domain is used to indicate levels of skilled performance. For example, a soldier training to be a sniper progresses from learning procedural task knowledge, such as stripping and assembling a weapon in the correct order, through to mastering the use of a weapon as a fully trained sniper who uses the weapon with effortless expertise.

Bloom's *cognitive* domain is the best known domain and is used extensively in education settings. It deals with the ways that a person's level of knowledge may be identified with an observable behaviour. Behaviours progress from demonstrating a basic knowledge of something to being able to analyse, synthesise, evaluate and create new knowledge. Taking our example of a sniper, they must be able to use their knowledge and comprehension of the weapon and its capabilities, analyse and calculate the effects of weather, the situation and the terrain, and evaluate these factors before deciding to take a shot.

Bloom's least known domain is the *affective* domain, which deals with attitudes and values. Behaviours progress from attentiveness to the integration of values and their influence on a particular situation. Again, referring to our sniper example, the sniper needs to be trained in the skills required to operate the weapon. They need to be educated on how to analyse a situation and conditions to employ the weapon, and finally, they need to be educated to apply their lethal capability ethically according to the rules of engagement and military laws.

The example of training and educating a sniper could be applied to a multitude of roles across our forces, from flying a helicopter to running a Tactical Operations Centre, to leading a Naval Boarding Team. The example illustrates the classic cognitive tension whereby the Defence Forces need personnel skilled in standardised techniques, drills, and procedures, while also being educated to think critically, creatively, and act ethically in stressful environments. This is what makes military training and education so challenging. Consequently, training and education are essential interrelated components of the Defence Forces training and education system. In the performance of a task, military personnel may combine basic procedural knowledge from the psychomotor domain with higher-order critical thinking skills from the cognitive domain, while considering the ethical consequences of their actions and decisions as leaders in a broader security situation, employing the affective domain.

Complex situations and operational realities challenge training and education in the military to be creative, realistic and ambitious. Hence, military training and education cannot be neatly cleaved into disparate functions. Sometimes, the focus is on learning a skill through developing procedural knowledge; on other occasions, developing a leader's higher-order thinking skills through education is the aim. The pedagogical reality is that both training and education can be employed in the same course or, indeed, in the same lesson.

Based upon the preceding paragraphs on jointness, the military profession, and training and education, Joint Professional Military Education is defined as:

The Defence Forces' system of training and education designed to develop the military capabilities of the organisation so that the Defence Forces can provide for the military defence of the State, contribute to national and international peace

and security and fulfil all other roles assigned by the Government. (Defence Forces, 2025, p. 1)

Essentially, it is the system of training and education used to develop Defence Forces' personnel and the organisation.

Accreditation

The unique and varied training and education needs of the Defence Forces has led to an education model where the Defence Forces work closely with Higher Education Institutions such as Maynooth University, South East Technological University (SETU), Munster Technological University (MTU), Technological University Dublin (TUD), and others to provide an accredited academic and military vocational education without diminishing the professional military identity. In his foreword to the strategy, McKenna underlines the importance of accreditation:

Fusing military-specific subjects with an academic education provides rich learning opportunities for Defence Forces personnel. This collaborative approach to PME has been validated during military service at home and overseas on Peace Support Operations. We must continue building and expanding dynamic educational partnerships, working closely with our partners to create and deliver innovative education programmes to ensure our personnel are trained and educated to perform their roles. (Defence Forces, 2025, p. 1)

The Defence Force has restated its commitment to work with academic partners to expand accreditation in support of capability development.

JPME Strategy 2025-2028 Framework

The overall framework for the JPME Strategy 2025-2028 is depicted in Figure 3. The Defence Forces' vision for JPME is to deliver exceptional joint military training and education that embodies excellence, integrity, and inclusivity. The Defence Forces are committed to fostering a learner-focused environment that ensures all personnel achieve accredited qualifications where appropriate and develop the knowledge and skills necessary to excel in their professional roles. The aim is to build a resilient, innovative, and capable training and education structure that upholds and fosters the highest standards of the profession of arms, in line with organisational values, so that the Defence Forces can achieve its mission.




Figure 3. JPME Strategy Framework Overview

Six guiding principles underpin the vision for JPME and guide mission-focused training and education delivery.

- Mission Focused
- Excellence
- Integrity
- Inclusivity
- Learner Focused
- Collaboration

The strategy has three strategic objectives to achieve the desired end state for JPME in the Defence Forces:

- **Enhance our Training and Education System:** The Defence Forces recognise the need to develop and enhance enabling policies and procedures to keep pace with best practices in military and higher education to ensure that the organisation can fulfil the roles assigned by the Government. Policies identified for review and development in the Action Plan include, inter alia, the Quality Assurance Policy, the Instructor Policy, and the Specific Learning Difficulties Policy.
- **Transform Learner Experience:** In the training and education environment, the Defence Forces must prioritise learner experience to maximise training and education opportunities. If Defence Forces personnel have access to high-quality training and education experiences, their skills and knowledge of the profession of arms will be enhanced, and it follows that personnel will have an enhanced ability to discharge their duties. Key actions in this area focuses on instructor development programmes, expanding blended learning, and update course design and delivery.
- **Develop the Organisation:** JPME has a significant role to play in developing the organisation to ensure it can achieve the goal of becoming a fit-for-purpose agile force. It can contribute to producing defence and security-related research that helps inform policy decisions. JPME could lead to research outputs that would improve the military's ability to develop capabilities and develop the organisation.

Each objective has associated actions required to achieve the goals detailed in the Action Plan. These actions will generate the effects necessary to establish the conditions essential for achieving the three strategic objectives and the desired end state.

The desired end state is to develop a high-quality joint military education system that equips military professionals with the theoretical and technical knowledge and skills in the profession of arms, fosters organisational learning and development so that the Defence Forces can provide for the military defence of the State, contribute to national and international peace and security, and fulfil all other roles assigned by the Government.

Career Pathways

Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the strategy focus on the training and education pathways and context for the Army, Navy, Air Corps, and Reserve Defence Forces. These sections of the strategy provide the vision for the domain, the training and education context and domain priorities. One of the Working Group's main debates throughout the writing process was whether to include future training pathways or just to reflect the current situation for each domain. The decision was made to incorporate the 'here and now' and address the changes required to pathways in the action plan. This decision was made as the ability to expand pathways is predicated on the development of future structures to deliver the training, such as the National Defence Academy and Apprentice School. For example, the Infantry School is operating at full capacity to deliver its current suite of courses for the Army. In the context of the Army's contribution to the joint force, the establishment of a Land Warfare Centre (LWC) is a key element of the Army's restructuring efforts under DIP Work Package 18.1, "Army Development." The Army is unable to expand its training and education pathways until the new Land Warfare College is established.

Implementation

The strategy addresses the need for continuous review and adaptation to ensure alignment with evolving security challenges and organisational changes. The action plan comprises several sub-projects that collectively contribute to achieving the strategic goals and the desired end-state. The JPME Implementation Working Group, which reports to the Defence Forces Academic Council (DFAC) led by the Director of Training and Education Branch under the authority of DCOS (Ops) will operationalise the strategy and ensure the action plan is delivered. This strategy will create the conditions for developing joint capabilities through training and education, ensuring that personnel can operate seamlessly and jointly across service domains.

Conclusion

JPME Strategy 2025-2028 is a pragmatic response to the challenges facing the Irish military training and education field. The strategic actions outlined in this strategy will need to be regularly reviewed to ensure they align with developments in the DIP, particularly in the context of establishing a National Defence Academy and Joint Educational Establishments, which are key enablers for organisational transformation.

One of the main strengths of this strategy is that it establishes fundamental principles for JPME and an actionable plan for its delivery. It defines what JPME is in the Irish context

and provides a vision and framework for the next four years. With each service providing career pathways and associated training and education requirements, it acknowledges the organisation's current position regarding JPME.

Establishing the organisation's current position in relation to JPME is a good starting point when trying to chart a way forward to cross Singer's bridge into a joint future.

Please note that the views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and should not be taken to represent the views of the Irish Defence Forces or of any other group or organisation.

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