David Murphy reviews "The Dhofar War: British Covert Campaigning in Arabia 1965-75" by Stephen Quick

The Dhofar War: British Covert Campaigning in Arabia 1965-75 by Stephen Quick. University of Exeter Press (2024) 253pp. ISBN 9781804130988

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This new book on the Dhofar War (also known as the Dhofar Rebellion) is a welcome addition to the literature on this conflict. There has been a consistent level of interest in this campaign in the decades since it ended, particularly among academics and military practitioners interested in Counterinsurgency (COIN). However, it would be no exaggeration to state that, for the wider public, this was not a high profile operation at the time due its largely covert nature, and there is little modern awareness of this conflict. This book redresses some of that imbalance, and offers many useful analogies that are relevant today.

This was a significant conflict during a very hot period of the Cold War, and it was not covered widely in the press as the fighting was confined to the remote Dhofar region of Oman. The war broke out when the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) decided to rebel against the power of the Sultanate of Oman, personified by Sultan Said bin Taimur, whom they saw as an oppressor. The DLF would later be joined by other rebel groups. Due to historic links with Britain, forces from the UK were brought in to train local forces and, eventually, deploy on specific COIN operations. The DLF’s ultimate goal was to establish a communist state, and in this way the Dhofar War fell within the wider pattern of small proxy wars during the Cold War  period, with the rebels receiving aid from South Yemen, China and the USSR. Considering the geographical location, this was seen as a “must win” scenario for the British government in the context of safeguarding access to oil in the Middle East. Oman would also be aided by Iran and Jordan. The turbulent nature of Omani politics did not help in the initial COIN efforts, as there was a coup in 1970, following which Taimur was replaced by his son, Qaboos Bin Said.

During the course of the next decade, British forces would play a significant role in this war, and they followed a pattern which had by then become an established format in COIN doctrine. There was a gradual shift from providing equipment, training and leadership, to engaging directly in COIN operations. Over 700 British personnel served in Dhofar and the conflict saw some significant contributions by the SAS, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Artillery, intelligence units, and also from supporting medical, LOGS and signalling units. This volume also discusses Omani use of military contractors and mercenaries, who collectively came to be known as the ‘Muscat Mafia’. Prominent among these was Colonel Timothy Landon, who allegedly amassed a fortune through his Omani contracts.

This book represents an interesting new treatment of this war. In strictly military terms, the Dhofar War was seen as a success, and as proof of the effectiveness of British COIN methods, its equipment and military personnel. Quick also charts, however, the varying degrees of commitment to this conflict during a succession of British governments. It can also be seen that interest flagged on the Omani side as the conflict dragged on, as all insurgencies tend to do.

Quick’s new book offers a complex interpretation of this conflict, showing that Britain was decisive in combatting the insurgency at the tactical and operational levels, but that achieving strategic effect was hampered due to the lack of long-term political focus and strategy. It is a metric that can be applied to many COIN campaigns of that time, and since.

Stephen Quick, is a former British officer who now works as an assistant professor in security studies at the Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi. He brings his knowledge as a practitioner, and some very deep research, to this new study of the Dhofar War. In the current context, much of the discussion in defence and security studies is focused on peer-on-peer conflict, but it would be foolish to assume that the era of small, complex conflicts is over. This volume has much to offer in that context. Perhaps a paperback edition might encourage a wider readership to engage with the many lessons that it offers.

 

DM, March 2025